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Summary 
 
The 1970’s are commonly known as a period of détente, or ease of tensions during the 
Cold War. But despite that, existing nuclear powers as the United States were still 
developing new weaponry and enlarging their nuclear arsenal whilst new nuclear 
powers such as South Africa entered the world stage. This created a situation in which 
large groups of peoples felt the need to start protesting the nuclear developments 
again, and a new wave of anti-nuclear protests started halfway through the 1970’s. A 
particular group of peoples participated in these protests: black anti-nuclear protesters. 
But to what extent were racism and anti-nuclear protests interconnected in the United 
States and South Africa between 1976 and 1981?  This thesis provides a comparison 
of the black protest movements in these two countries to provide a starting point for 
an international research on the interconnection between racial discrimination and 
anti-nuclear protests. 
 There is an interconnection between racial discrimination and anti-nuclear 
protests. Both African Americans and black South Africans felt a feeling of injustice 
and felt racially discriminated due to the nuclear policies of their countries. For the 
African American protesters, the investments in the nuclear programme were 
unacceptable because they had very poor living conditions, much worse than white 
Americans. For the South African black protesters, the nuclear developments by the 
white minority government had to be stopped since this provided much military 
strength for the government. In their opinion, the racist apartheid laws could never be 
ended if the government gained such a strong position in Africa.  
 David Meyer’s theory of Political Opportunity Structure explains that 
successful protest groups in the past managed to become part of the political system 
and step into the political space, instead of just showing their dissatisfaction with the 
government policy. Being well institutionalized in society would make it easier to 
step into the political space that was present in the détente period. But for the South 
African protesters this was much harder than for the American protesters since they 
could only institutionalize themselves in a revolutionary organization such as the 
ANC, or in church organisations such as the AACC. This resulted in a great 
difference in the way the protest movements were organized in the United States and 
South Africa, and in the protest methods they used.  
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 Both the American and the South African protesters were aware that the 
nuclear developments in their countries were dependent on foreign allies or enemies, 
and although the movements were very different, both relied heavily on international 
allies. There was also contact between the South African and the American protesters, 
but this did not result in a clear transfer of ideas.    
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Introduction 
 
In 1977 the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) published a little yellow 
book with the secretive title ‘The Nuclear Conspiracy’. The AACC, a fellowship of 
hundreds of churches throughout Africa, sounded the alarm on the critical situation in 
South Africa. Decades earlier already, with help of the United States and other 
Western countries, the South African government had been able to explore the 
possibilities of uranium mining. But halfway through the 1970’s, there were rumours 
that the South Africans were secretly using the obtained technologies to build their 
own atomic weapons.1  
 According to the AACC, South Africa’s possible ability to produce nuclear 
weaponry created a very unwanted situation for black South Africans. The AACC 
was not opposed to the production of nuclear power because of environmental reasons 
or a pacifist ideology. Their main argument was that this brought ‘a most dangerous 
and unwarranted escalation of the racial tension in Southern Africa, especially in the 
light of the struggle of the oppressed peoples of that region to liberate themselves 
from white racist minority rule’.2 In other words, the AACC was afraid that a 
government in possession of nuclear technology would strengthen apartheid and 
would give the ruling white government in South Africa an even greater power over 
the oppressed black inhabitants. 
 The situation in South Africa was poignant for the AACC and their nuclear 
resistance. South Africa’s nuclear policy could strengthen the racial segregation in the 
country. But their situation was not entirely unique. In the highly tensed Cold War 
background, the United States witnessed a similar situation. The 1960’s and 1970’s 
marked a turbulent period in the United States because of, amongst other things, 
African-Americans who were fighting for their human rights. The possession of 
nuclear arsenal by the United States government was a recurring element in their 
protests. Well-known protagonists of the American black minority, like Martin Luther 
King, explicitly spoke out against this nuclear policy: ‘Somehow we must transform 
the dynamics of the world power struggle from the negative nuclear arms race which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Letter from J.S. Wall to Bryan Cartledge, 'South African Nuclear Intentions', September 08, 1977, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, UK National Archives (online archive)  
<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116613 >  [01.03.2017]. 
2 The Nuclear conspiracy, All Africa Conference of Churches (Nairobi 1977) iv.   
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no one can win to a positive contest to harness man’s creative genius for the purpose 
of making peace and prosperity a reality for all of the nations of the world.  In short, 
we must shift the arms race into a peace race.’3 The South African and the American 
black anti-nuclear movement seemed to be interconnected by the motivation for their 
anti-nuclear protests: the nuclear policy strengthened racism. 
 Because the détente period has often been regarded as a less dangerous period 
than the previous decades, the anti-nuclear protests in this era have to be viewed in a 
different context than the protests in the 1960’s. Some of the black anti-nuclear 
movements were already active for many years before the protests of the 1970’s, but 
others were fairly new. David S. Meyer explains in his article Protest Cycles and 
Political Process the theory of Political Opportunity Structure, which ‘refers to the 
institutional and political factors that shape social movement options’.4 This refers to 
the way in which a political space, or a political chance, comes into being when 
public opinion is not aligned with government policies, and already existing groups 
are not able to address this non-alignment. In the situation studied here, an 
opportunity was created for the anti-nuclear activists to reach a wider audience. This 
might also enable the movements to institutionalize further.5 Even more this is the 
case for the black anti-nuclear groups, who tried to address both the nuclear policy 
and segregation. The main motivation of these anti-nuclear movements was a racial 
one, instead of an environmental or pacifist one. The black anti-nuclear protest 
movements are intersectional. They were not just anti-nuclear movements; they were 
also social rights movements.  
 But in what way did the black social rights movements in the United States 
and South Africa protest against the nuclear policy of their countries between 1976 
and 1981? And what caused these movements to be founded in the first place and who 
were their allies? What is the value of the use of the political theoretical position of 
the Political Opportunity Structures theory in historical research of anti-nuclear 
movements? And how did the racial context affect the protests against the bomb in 
the two countries? In short: to what extent were racism and anti-nuclear protests 
interconnected in the United States and South Africa between 1976 and 1981?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Martin Luther King Jr. - Nobel Lecture: The Quest for Peace and Justice, Nobel Media AB 2017 
(undated) <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-lecture.html> 
[05.03.2017]. 
4 David S. Meyer, ‘Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear 
Age’, Political Research Quarterly 46:3 (1993) 451-479, there 455. 
5 Ibidem. 
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 In this MA thesis, I will compare the efforts made by both the South African 
and the United States’ black population to protest the nuclear policy of their countries 
in the second half of the 1970’s. During this period, anti-nuclear protests in the United 
States and South Africa started looming again, since they had been pushed to the 
background in the previous years due to the Vietnam War.6 The protests also became 
more widespread throughout the countries, which makes it possible to focus in more 
detail on specific aspects of the protests.7 But despite this wide range of protests, 
source material on this matter is still scarce. Authors who have written articles or 
books on this topic, such as Intondi and Wittner, have used a wide variety of primary 
source material in order to interpret this phenomenon. I will take a similar approach, 
by analysing a wide variety of primary source material as well. By doing so I am able 
to provide a complete overview of the most important protest movements and the 
protests they conducted.  
 In contrast to numerous other studies on anti-nuclear groups, I will not focus 
on the direct influence of such groups on the nuclear policy. The focus of this thesis is 
on the groups themselves and their motives and means. A comparative study between 
American and South African anti-nuclear movements is unique and has not been 
conducted yet. This is remarkable, since these two movements are similar due to their 
subordinate role in society. This thesis takes a first step in the direction of a 
transnational history of anti-nuclear protest movements who were motivated by a 
racial struggle. In doing so, I will determine and explain the efforts that were made by 
these anti-nuclear movements and to what extent race and nuclear developments were 
interconnected.  
 
Détente and the second wave of anti-nuclear protests 
 A trend in literature on the study of anti-nuclear protests during the détente 
period evolves around the different views on the détente period and on the origin and 
timeframe of the second big wave of anti-nuclear protests. There were protests going 
on in both South Africa and the United States in the mid 1970’s but various scholars 
are still divided about the question whether the anti-nuclear protests started again 
during, or after this period. As well, the question whether the détente period should, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Wittner, The Struggle Against The Bomb, 25. 
7 Marco Giugni, Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in 
Comparative Perspective (Lanham 2004) 43. 
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or should not be regarded as a period of declining nuclear threat is a point of 
discussion.  
 According to Lawrence Wittner, the greater share of anti-nuclear protests has 
taken place from the 1940’s to the 1960’s. As Wittner notices in the third part of his 
extensive trilogy The Struggle Against the Bomb ‘during the mid-1970s, nuclear 
weapons went largely unnoticed.’8 Wittner is however, very clearly in stating that the 
anti-nuclear protests grew again from 1975 onwards. In many countries, the anti-
nuclear movement grew steadily and resulted in a new worldwide wave of protests 
between 1975 and 1978.9 In South Africa there had been no previous wave of anti-
nuclear protests since the developments of nuclear weaponry had only started 
recently. There, protests started in 1976, with the discovery of this programme.  
Vincent Intondi agrees with Wittner and argues that the anti-nuclear protests started 
blooming again around 1976. As he states in his book African Americans Against the 
Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement: ‘Despite 
of all the treaties and agreements however, the development of nuclear weapons 
actually increased in the 1970s.’10 Due to the increasing nuclear weapon stockpile, 
and the development of new weaponry, such as the neutron bomb at the end of the 
1970’s, the many poor minorities in the United States believed that their bad 
economic and social position was created by the development of such programs.11 As 
well, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 marks the starting point of an increase in 
anti-nuclear protests, instead of anti-war protests. The anti-war movements shifted 
their focus to anti-nuclear efforts. Black South Africans were in a similar position as 
the African Americans, with apartheid being still present and the white minority 
government pushing nuclear developments. Protests against the South African nuclear 
programme started around the same time as the protests in the United States because 
the African Americans and the black South Africans both felt that their subordinate 
role in society was even getting worse due to the nuclear developments.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against The Bomb: Volume 3. Towards Nuclear Abolition 
(California 2003) 1. 
9 Lawrence S. Wittner, ‘The Forgotten Years of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1975-78’, 
Journal of Peace Research 40:4 (2003) 435-456, there 435. 
10 Vincent Intondi, African Americans Against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the 
Black Freedom Movement (Stanford 2015) 87. 
11 Ibidem.  
12 Ibidem. 
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 Besides Intondi’s argument that the détente period was not necessarily a 
period of disarmament, there is another reason to take a closer look at this period. 
Meyer mentions that the second half of the 1970’s mark the start of a new 
international wave of big anti-nuclear protests, just like the ones that happened in the 
1960’s. Such waves are distinguishable by the size of the protest movements. During 
such waves, the anti-nuclear protests went beyond the local area and sometimes even 
mobilized people throughout the whole country.13 The combination of such a wave of 
protests and the position of the black Americans and South Africans provides a 
context in which racism and the nuclear developments are interconnected. This wave 
of protests has not yet been looked into from such a context. 
 Mario Del Pero provides a nuance in the idea of anti-nuclear revival in the 
1970’s. In We Are All Harrisburg, Del Pero argues that to understand the novelty of 
the protests in the mid 1970’s, the combination between lobbying in politics and local 
activism is of great importance. This is due to four factors that paved the way for anti-
nuclear protests: a growing awareness of ecological results from the growing nuclear 
industry, a shattered trust in politicians and nuclear technocrats as part of the 
worldwide ‘anti-authoritarian mood of the late 1960s and early 1970s’, a series of 
mistakes made by the utilities, and a growth in regulations for the nuclear power 
industry, as a result of growing environmental awareness. 14 Grass-root movements 
proved to be very successful in benefitting from these circumstances because ‘the loss 
of public faith in the nation’s elites and the expansion of public participation in 
government decisions permanently expanded community control over nuclear issues.’ 
As well, these factors provided people with leverage to bring their problems with the 
nuclear industry into the political debate.15  
 However, there are scholars who tend to argue that the second wave of anti-
nuclear protests did not start in the halfway through the 1970’s. Scholars such as 
David Cortright and April Carter tend to argue that the anti-nuclear protests on a great 
scale started in 1979. Carter dedicated two chapters to this in her book Peace 
Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945. According to 
Carter, there was a ‘strong groundswell of public opposition to nuclear weapons after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Meyer, ‘Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age’ 452. 
14 Mario Del Pero, ‘We Are All Harrisburg: Three Mile Island and the Ultimate Indivisibility of the 
Atom’, RSA Journal (Rivista di Studi Americani) 26 (2015) 143-173, there 149-150.  
15 Ibidem, 151.  
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a period of apparent apathy towards the dangers of nuclear arsenals’.16 The second 
wave of anti-nuclear protest was the result of a growing consciousness about 
environmental issues. But according to Carter, the direct reason for the new wave of 
protests can be appointed to the decisions from NATO to deploy new types of 
missiles in Europe. New protests started in Western Europe due to this decision and 
later on started in the United States and other continents as well.  
 Cortright agrees with Carter on the starting date of the new wave of protests in 
1979. As he notices, ‘the antinuclear campaigns of the late 1970s were rooted in 
environmental consciousness and growing public concerns about radiation and the 
fragility of nuclear technology.’17 According to Cortright, existing disarmament 
treaties, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), did no longer create 
the desired situation. This caused a rise in fear for nuclear disasters during the first 
years of the1980’s, even worse than in any other time during the Cold War. This 
caused an increase in anti-nuclear protest in both Europe and the United States.18  
 Nina Tannenwald provides a different view on the détente period as a period 
of less nuclear tensions. In The Nuclear Taboo, Tannenwald argues that it did not 
matter that the nuclear disarmament wasn’t effective in the 1970’s. According to 
Tannenwald, there was a taboo on the use of nuclear weaponry from the Second 
World onwards. When people witnessed the horrors that a nuclear weapon could 
bring, it became impossible for states to use their nuclear weapons ‘without incurring 
moral opprobrium or political costs.’19 Thus, nuclear weapons have never been used 
anymore due to the stigmatization of these weapons as very much unacceptable 
weapons. The operability of these weapons had already ceased to exist before the 
1970’s. 20 Paradoxically, there was still a buildup of nuclear weaponry throughout the 
world, but this was mainly due to the fact that they could still be used for deterrence. 
Tannenwald does mention that this normative taboo is present in all states. She 
emphasizes that the taboo is mainly present in open democratic states, but can be less 
present in nondemocratic countries. This would mean that the theory could be less 
applicable to South Africa in contrast to the United States.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 April Carter, Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945 (London 1992) 
108. 
17 David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge 2008) 140. 
18 Ibidem, 141. 
19 Nina Tannenwald, ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-
Use’, International Organization 53:3 (1999) 433-468, there 463. 
20 Tannenwald, ‘The Nuclear Taboo’, 433. 
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 Although there is a discussion on whether the wave of protests started halfway 
through the 1970’s or later, active protests were conducted from 1976 onwards in 
both the United States and South Africa. A racial view on anti-nuclear protests has 
been underdeveloped in the field of anti-nuclear research studies. Although Vincent 
Intondi provides a great starting point for this racial point of view, many other studies 
seem to neglect the fact that this can be of importance for the general view on anti-
nuclear protests. Besides that, his study has a very broad focus in terms of African 
American activism (not only on nuclear weaponry), but does not connect this to other 
countries with similar developments.  The chosen period of study provides a good 
timeframe for an international study on efforts with a racial motivation in anti-nuclear 
protests. 
 
Structure 
 To be able to make a good comparison between the anti-nuclear movements in 
these two different nations, it is important to provide a general context. Therefore it 
needs to become clear how the nuclear weaponry of these nations became symbols of 
power, and why there were movements protesting this, before the actual analysis can 
be made. This context will be provided extensively in chapter one. After having 
established the reasons for the protests, I will provide the analysis of the protest 
movements themselves. Chapter two will be devoted to the first part of the analysis: 
the American case study. This chapter will start with a short introduction on the 
particular protest movements, followed by the analysis of the protests. The analysis 
consists of the following components: the institutionalisation of the movements, 
protest methods, message and rhetoric, religious influence and spatial relations. For 
the analysis of the American case I will make use of primary sources by the various 
black anti-nuclear movements, in combination with newspaper articles and 
governmental documents.21 The third chapter will deal with the South African case 
study. This chapter will have the same structure as the second chapter to provide a 
solid comparison of the two case studies. The analysis in chapter three will be largely 
based on publications by the various movements, and the national archives in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The most consulted archives are the following: Archive of the War Resisters International at the 
International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam; The United States National Security Archive 
(online); African Activist Archive (online); ANC archive (online); Global Nonviolent Action Database 
(online); Swarthmore College Peace Collection (online); and primary source material from the AACC. 
A detailed overview of the used sources is listed in the bibliography. 
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these protests are mentioned. As well, source material from the United Nations and 
American governmental documents will be used. After the analysis, the results of the 
comparison will be presented in the conclusion and there will be confirmed whether 
there was a transfer of ideas between the South African and the American black anti-
nuclear movements.  
 
Pitfalls 
 I have taken into account various principles provided by Stefan Berger to 
assure that the comparison will be successful. As he states: ‘For comparative history 
to succeed, it is essential (…) to make it an integral part of a theoretically aware 
analytical history, rather than a specialist sub-discipline’.22 To make sure that I have 
provided a ‘theoretically aware’ analysis I have provided some limitations to my 
comparison. 
 To start with, I have based my analysis of the black anti-nuclear movements 
and their protests on both internal documents and external interpretations of their 
activities. I am aware of the notion that internal sources from the movements may be 
biased and have thus added external sources to make sure that the argument in this 
thesis is solidly grounded. The source material coming from the various protest 
movements, especially from the South African movements, often have a political 
purpose. Because of that, they should be looked into with a critical view. Often, such 
sources can be used for propaganda against the government.  
 Besides that, I have taken into account that a national analysis might be too 
broad. Because of that I have added local aspects of the protests movements as well. 
As Berger recalls, regional comparisons are ‘less vulnerable to reductionism’ because 
the researcher will be able to look into ‘the totality of structures, experiences and 
values’.23 The interpretation of the activities on a national scale, in combination with 
more local initiatives, can provide this totality. Susanne Schregel provides a good 
example for a similar research on anti-nuclear groups in the 1970’s and the beginning 
of the 1980’s, in which this spatial dimension is of great importance. Schregel 
compared the protest movements of grassroots nuclear-free zone initiatives in 
different continents. According to Schregel, various protest groups were protesting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Stefan Berger, ‘Comparative History’ in: Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner and Kevin Passmore eds., 
Writing History: Theory and Practice (London 2003) 161-180, there 162. 
23  Ibidem. 
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because they questioned the ‘legitimacy or effectiveness of national defence strategies 
based on nuclear deterrence’.24 In her research Schregel gave a great attention to the 
spatial dimension because the protests were not only supposed to have local 
outcomes, but were as well meant to have a more global effect. In this thesis, I take a 
similar approach since the protest movements protested their nations’ policies by 
acting at the local level. Because of this, I will also briefly look at international allies 
of the American and South African black anti-nuclear movements. This is what 
Schregel describes as ‘global micropolitics’.25 
 Since I will mainly be looking for unifying factors between the two protest 
movements, I will look into similarities between the two movements. It will be, of 
course, impossible to make a comparison without taking into account the differences 
of the two movements as well, but since I want to provide an insight into the anti-
racist element in anti-nuclear protests, I will try to look for common features. In other 
words, I am trying to show how similar developments, in this case resisting nuclear 
weaponry, can produce different results.  
 A final limitation that is used to make the comparison in this thesis complete 
and clear is that it won’t focus on all black anti-nuclear groups, but will only analyse 
the largest and most influential movements that had a large share of black activists or 
consisted of black members only. There were countless smaller grassroots initiatives, 
but only in a few cases did the anti-nuclear protests spread wider and actually have an 
influence on mainstream politics.26 Smaller initiatives are taken into account, as part 
of the broader movement. 
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Chapter 1: (Inter) national Context 
 
1.1 Working towards the breaking point: United States 
Before it is possible to compare the black anti-nuclear groups in South Africa and the 
United States, the context of the nuclear developments in these two countries in the 
1970’s and 1980’s should be outlined. Both the United States and South Africa had a 
different geopolitical position and their nuclear power and policies varied greatly. 
Looking into the motives of obtaining nuclear weaponry, it becomes clear what policy 
the black anti-nuclear groups were protesting and why they did this.  
 In 1977, William Epstein provided a list of argumentations for states to start 
building a nuclear arsenal during the Cold War. Not only deterrence was a big 
motivator for having nuclear weaponry, but also the achievement of military 
superiority and military independence are also important.27 According to Epstein, the 
United States initially developed nuclear weaponry to be able to maintain military 
superiority in WWII. But as WWII ended and the United States entered the Cold War, 
the motives for the United States to have a nuclear arsenal changed. Preventing 
enemies from getting even close to superiority over the United States became of great 
importance. In the nuclear arms race of the Cold War, one of the main targets of the 
United States was making sure that their nuclear arsenal was bigger that that of the 
Soviet Union because this was deemed essential for national security.28  
 During the 1970’s, the détente, marked by the signing of various nuclear 
treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty in 1968, caused a relaxation of 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.29 But as previously 
mentions, authors such as Intondi and Wittner argue that this period was actually a 
period of increasing nuclear stockpiles. According to Intondi, the goal of the United 
States was ‘negotiating a way to keep nuclear weapons rather than eliminate them.’30  
 As Ronald Reagan stated in 1976, a few years before his presidency, the 
United States had become the number two in nuclear power because of the 
disarmament policy of his predecessor. He was determined to make the United States 	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the biggest nuclear power again, to be able to ‘counter-balance’ the Soviet Union 
once more.31 Already in the second half of the 1960’s, the United States had a double 
objective in the disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. The goal was to be 
able to restrict the Soviets as much as possible, but without limiting their own arsenal. 
Once the Vietnam War would be over, the United States wanted to be able to defend 
itself against other enemies.32 The results of these developments were huge. Between 
1972 and 1977, over 4500 nuclear warheads were added to the already existing 
nuclear arsenal, counting up to a total of over 9000 warheads, bombs and strategic 
missiles.33 So even though the 1970’s are considered as a period of détente, the 
nuclear arsenal was becoming bigger and bigger. 
 Although Reagan would not be president for a few more years, new 
developments in the field of nuclear weaponry, set in motion by his predecessors, 
started shortly after Reagan’s announcements on his ideas about strengthening the 
nuclear program. On the 6th of June 1977, The Washington Post revealed a story on 
the American Research and Development Administration (ERDA) budget, which 
apparently was partly used for the development of new nuclear weaponry.34 In the 
first half of the 1970’s, President Nixon had started investing in a more powerful 
nuclear weapon: the neutron bomb. Neutron bombs would be able to have a similar 
impact as the already existing nuclear weaponry, but without causing as many civilian 
casualties due to heat and blast reduction.35 The development of the neutron bomb 
went on, even after President Nixon had to step down as president of the United 
States to be replaced first by President Ford, after whom Jimmy Carter was elected in 
1976. As President Carter was advocating a smaller dependency on nuclear weaponry, 
he stated that the revealing of the neutron bomb budget in the ERDA came to him as a 
surprise. Nevertheless, the damage was already done.36 The public announcement of 
the huge investments was not received well and protests started right away and would 
continue for years. 
 Both national anti-nuclear movements and locally active grassroots 
movements started actively rallying against the American nuclear policy from the 	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mid-1970’s onwards. Obtaining a clear overview of the black anti-nuclear protesters 
in the United States causes various problems. There were almost no particularly black 
anti-nuclear groups, as was the case in the protest wave of the 1960’s. Most groups 
were mixed-race but had a large group of black members or had certain chapters with 
a large share of black members. But still it is possible to identify a clear black anti-
nuclear movement. Based on existing religious and human rights organisations, the 
black protesters managed to find a platform to express their own concern about their 
rights. One of the major organisations that protested the nuclear policy in the 1970’s 
was the War Resisters League (WRL). The WRL had divisions all across the country, 
with several divisions predominantly formed by black members. One of these major 
black divisions was The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), founded 
by Martin Luther King Jr. and several other human rights activists.37 Also, religious 
organisations like the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Fellowship of 
Reconcilliation (FOR), and pacifist organisations such as the Clamshell Alliance (CA) 
and SANE had a big share of black members who mobilised against the nuclear 
policy. 
 Looking into the black anti-nuclear movement in the United States in the 
second half of the détente period, it seems that two different developments were 
taking place. The first one is the development of older anti-nuclear groups, such as the 
WRL, FOR and the AFSC. These movements had already established an extensive 
network of activists throughout the United States and beyond, and used this network 
to spread their message of nuclear disarmament. Although some of these older and 
more institutionalised groups had troubles with re-establishing themselves after the 
end of the Vietnam War, they managed to reset their priorities and regain popularity 
amongst the population.38 The other development was the dissemination of local 
initiatives, as done for instance by the Movement for a New Society (MNS), 
Mobilization for Survival (MFS) and the Women Strike for Peace (WSP). These 
organisations had a primary goal to enlarge the quantity of their initiatives. Because 
of these two developments, the anti-nuclear movement in general managed to regain 
success in the second half of the 1970’s, and the black anti-nuclear movement grew 
along with it. 
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1.2 African-Americans: segregation and poverty 
 Despite decades of efforts to end segregation and differences in the position of 
the African-Americans in the American society, African-Americans were far from 
equal to white Americans. Between the 1940’s and the 1960’s, both blacks and whites 
in American society benefited from a higher standard of living. But black Americans 
remained significantly behind white Americans. Due to economic decline, for the first 
time since WW II, the earnings of Americans in general declined in 1973. This 
stagnant economy left many people in poverty. On a national level, around 20% of all 
children in America were raised in poverty. But among the black population, this 
percentage was almost 45. The material possessions of blacks in relation to whites 
declined as well. An important reason for this was institutionalised developments 
such as residential segregation.39 In the 1950’s and 1960’s, a clear and 
institutionalized segregation was present, mainly in the cities throughout the whole 
United States. Residential segregation resulted in a nation that became more and more 
a divided society: the black and mainly poor people who lived in the city centres, and 
the prosperous and predominantly white people who had moved to the suburbs of the 
cities.40 
 Another main influence on the position of African-Americans in the 1970’s 
was the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War, which ended in 1975, had helped weaken 
the idea that black Americans were physically inferior to white Americans. Fighting 
side by side, although not completely unsegregated, the American people could prove 
themselves ‘capable and patriotic warriors’.41 But although they had proved 
themselves, this did not make them equal to white soldiers after the war was over. At 
the end of the Vietnam War it had become clear that most black enlistees had joined 
the army because of economic reasons. The unemployment rates of the black youth 
were much higher than the rates of the white youth. When the war ended, these black 
soldiers returned to the communities with very high levels of unemployment. Almost 
one-third of the young black veterans were left without a job. Although the Vietnam 
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War had done much good to the position of black people in the American army, lots 
of them returned home disillusioned. 42   
1.3 Working towards the breaking point: South Africa 
 The story of South Africa’s nuclear weapons development followed a 
completely different path from the United States. But nevertheless the black anti-
nuclear movements in the two countries were interconnected.  
 In 1957 South Africa became the fourth nation to join the American Atoms for 
Peace program. This program was initiated by the Eisenhower administration in order 
to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide.43 With it’s huge uranium 
reserves and an economy based on the mining industry, South Africa had great 
potential for the nuclear industry. In the following decade, South Africa received 
support from the United States in deploying their nuclear energy programme. With 
the help of the United States, which provided South Africa with one of their nuclear 
research reactors called SAFARI I, South Africa managed to build a solid base for 
their nuclear intentions and they managed to produce several working nuclear plants. 
But times changed and throughout the 1960’s, the South African government was 
subjected to a growing opposition from the international community to their political 
situation. Sanctions were imposed against apartheid, which also affected the South 
African nuclear program. The sanctions deprived South Africa of oil reserves and 
with the help of nuclear energy the South African government hoped to be able to 
convert their great coal reserves into gasoline. In combination with rising pressure 
from communist influences in Africa, the white minority government felt cornered 
and isolated from their former allies. This situation made the South African 
government decide that they would not only need nuclear energy, but also nuclear 
weaponry. With that kind of weaponry they would be able to strategically deter 
enemies in their region.44 
 In 1977, Soviet satellites over the Kalahari Desert detected a South African 
nuclear test site. The South African government had used the plant built around the 
SAFARI I reactor to enrich uranium for the use of nuclear weaponry. To the 
international community, the security risks that South Africa claimed to have were 	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questionable. Brian Kaper mentions in his article Understanding the South African 
Nuclear Experience and its Application to Iran that possible security risks for South 
Africa were almost impossible to solve with nuclear weaponry: ‘The security threats 
facing the South African government were a mixture of internal or nearby conflicts, 
which could not be responded to with nuclear weapons, or extremely far fetched 
scenarios involving nuclear powers.’45 South Africa could easily stand up to the 
weaker countries in their direct surroundings with their conventional military forces. 
As well, actions against South Africa by the Soviet Union seemed unlikely since the 
Western powers still had great interests in South Africa. Besides that, the country was 
geographically too far away for the Soviet missiles to conduct a direct attack.46 
Apparently it seemed more likely that the South African government was creating 
nuclear weaponry for domestic reasons: retaining power over its own people. This did 
not mean that they were directly planning on deploying a nuclear bomb on their own 
territory, but it did strengthen the hand of the apartheid regime since they now could 
threaten with using the nuclear weaponry. 
 Epstein agrees with Kaper and Intondi that South Africa started producing 
nuclear weaponry to be able to deter enemies within their own borders, or smaller 
neighbouring countries. Epstein categorizes South Africa as a ‘third-class nuclear 
power’, as it didn’t really have the capacity to deter other countries on a broader 
international scale with their small arsenal.47 But in the Southern part of Africa, the 
nuclear weaponry provided a significant advantage since it provides both deterrence 
as well as a military superiority. In the South African case, the nuclear weapons 
provided a major deterrence against the black Africans both inside and outside the 
country; as they were not able to match the military power that nuclear weaponry 
brought the white South African government.48 The South African government was 
unclear in their intentions with the nuclear weaponry. Whereas they publicly 
announced that they had peaceful goals with their nuclear programme, they were not 
willing to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty.49  	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1.4 Black South Africans: majority population but minority position 
 In 1980, the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against 
Apartheid, strikingly and critically named the South African government in a report 
about the South African nuclear program: ‘The regime in South Africa is unique in 
that it is based on and committed to racism. It has an unparalleled record of defiance 
of the United Nations and of aggression against neighboring states. It has not flinched 
from mass deportations of millions of people and massacres of peaceful 
demonstrators, including little children, in order to maintain the system of racist 
domination and exploitation.’50 This description of the South African government 
seemed striking at the time. Being governed by a powerful white minority, the black 
majority of the South Africans were seen as inferior. The South African government, 
following the victory of the National party in the elections of 1948, introduced the 
policy of Apartheid. This meant that white and black South Africans were meant to 
live separately, and were not allowed to have interracial relationships of marriages. 
From the 1960’s until the 1980’s the South African government decided to relocate 
large parts of the black South African population into Reserves. Races were classified 
and particular groups were moved to a designated homeland. In this way, the white 
government would be able to rule over the greater share of the South African territory, 
with the black majority being kept on small ‘homelands’, also called ‘Bantu’. Sixteen 
Administration Boards that reported directly to the white government in Pretoria 
governed the Bantu. The white government invested a lot of money in the creation of 
townships in these Reserves, for the black population to be able to resettle, but this 
did not achieve the desired results since there were many internal disputes in the 
Reserves. 51 
 The policy of resettlement was heavily criticized from the beginning. The 
removal of black people from their homes, the bad condition of amenities in the 
Bantu, a great lack of jobs and general bad living conditions were unacceptable to 
many. Strikes and rural unrest had become normal, but halfway through the 1970’s 
protest grew bigger. Despite being disadvantaged by the great relocations and being 
forced to start a new life elsewhere, the black inhabitants managed to develop 
themselves. The black working class had grown and education provisioned by the 
state had made this group better educated. Thus, this working class was better able to 	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organize their protests against the white government. At the same time, the 1960’s 
and 1970’s were a time of inflation. Wages of black workers had stagnated and due to 
inflation, the situation of the working class had worsened and unemployment numbers 
rose again.52  
 Despite the nuclear developments in South Africa, just as in the United States, 
there was a period of détente. In the years prior to 1975, the strategy of the white 
minority regime was based on two principles: making sure that South Africa would 
not have neighbours that were hostile to the regime and making sure that they did not 
have to interfere in these neighbouring countries on a large military scale.53 
Throughout the 1960’s these two principles, which could be regarded as 
contradictory, worked together quite well. But in 1974 this situation was no longer 
possible. It became clear that guerrilla regimes, which were largely left wing, would 
take over Mozambique and Angola and possibly Rhodesia as well. This would cause 
a grave threat to the white minority regime and at first they publicly stated they would 
meet this threat with military action. But instead they chose a different of settling the 
problems both inside South Africa as in the neighbouring countries. White settlers in 
Angola and Mozambique staged bloody revolts, showing that South African help was 
necessary and would be welcome. The South African government used this situation 
by showing that they were willing to help bring peace to the region and even stated 
that they would welcome controlled decolonization in neighbouring countries by the 
western powers. The white minority government presented themselves in a peaceful, 
cooperative way to the conservative new neighbours. The Bantu’s in South Africa had 
grown very big and there was a chance that they might gain independence from the 
white minority government. By supporting the neighbouring decolonized 
governments, the white minority government showed its willingness for the good 
cause of decolonization. It also hoped to gain powerful support from these new 
governments to make sure that they would remain the rulers of South Africa: ‘South 
Africa would thus become a great federal patchwork of (moderate) black states and a 
single, smaller white state which puts its capital and expertise at the disposal of the 
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collective good’.54 This was a utopic conception of the situation by the South African 
government, and the situation would prove to be less simple for them.  
 Religious and human rights organizations, such as the earlier mentioned 
AACC, were convinced that the South African government would benefit from 
having nuclear weaponry because it secured their military superiority and the black 
South Africans, although being a majority, could never resist the Apartheid regime. 
Even without actually using the bomb, the deterrence of having nuclear weaponry and 
demonstrating to other countries that they were not willing to give up apartheid were 
powerful signals. The international critique of the regime was becoming less effective 
because of the strengthening position of South Africa. To the black South Africans, it 
seemed that living in the Reserves would be the only option, unless they were able to 
effectively resist this policy. 
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Chapter 2: The American Case 
 
2.1 Intro: The motives of the African-American anti-nuclear movement 
 Before looking into the actual protests of the black anti-nuclear movements in 
the United States, it is important to outline the motives of the protestors more 
thoroughly. As mentioned in the first chapter, the majority of black Americans felt 
they were treated as being inferior to white Americans. This chapter will analyse 
black anti-nuclear movements by looking into the anti-nuclear movement in general, 
and then focus on the groups that had a large share of black members. The research 
does not aim to provide a complete outline of the black protest movement. Vincent 
Intondi has already provided this in detail. The main goal is to analyse the protests 
themselves and determine what they were protesting against and with what means.  
 Both anti-nuclear sentiment and the anti-nuclear movement in general were 
growing between 1976 and 1981. This was different in the first half of the détente 
period, from 1970 onwards. As the African-American anti-war movement, Sojourner 
Truth Organization (STO) stated in a document on all American anti-war movements 
in 1972, around the 1972 elections the anti-war sentiment was growing, but the 
movements did not grow along with that sentiment.55 According to the STO, the anti-
war movements were ineffective and issued protest programs that were not able to 
mobilize the masses in a useful sense.56 This ineffectiveness changed halfway through 
the 1970’s, when the sentiment began to fuel a larger movement. As becomes clear 
from correspondence between the WRL and befriended anti-nuclear movements, at 
the beginning of the 1980’s there were approximately 3000 anti-nuclear movements 
in the United States.57 A large share of them consisted of smaller initiatives or 
grassroots movements, but this incredible amount does clearly show that there was a 
large movement present at that time. This success can partly be related to the ending 
of the Vietnam War in 1975. The Vietnam War was no longer the main subject of 
anti-war protesters, and the nuclear bomb was brought to the forefront of protests 
once again. Various anti-war movements changed their anti-war strategy to a specific 
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anti-nuclear one and issued statements about the renewal of their priorities.58 But the 
step to a flourishing anti-nuclear movement did not go easily. Letters being sent to 
members of the WRL and FOR in 1975 shows that these movements were in a serious 
financial crisis for some time. They saw themselves forced to ask all their members to 
donate money. The reserve funds were entirely gone because they had to buy 
buildings to operate from and institutionalize themselves to be able to form a better-
organized movement. The number of members decreased around 1975 because of the 
ending of the Vietnam War. Anti-war sentiments declined because the war that had 
been protested against for over 20 years was now brought to an end. It took some time 
before people appreciated that there were other direct threats in the world.59 The 
groups had to shift their focus from protesting the Vietnam War to protesting the 
nuclear policy in order to avoid their bankruptcy.  
 For the black protesters in particular, addressing the issue of nuclear 
disarmament was of great importance. Most of the black anti-nuclear protesters did 
not belong to entirely black anti-nuclear groups. They belonged to a broader 
movement of anti-nuclear activists who not only focused on nuclear disarmament, but 
also fought inequality and racism in American society.  
 As mentioned previously, the second half of the détente period did not bring a 
reduced nuclear arsenal for the United States. But for many African-Americans, the 
1977 Washington Post story on the ERDA budget was the straw that broke the 
camel’s back. Because of bad living conditions and fewer opportunities than white 
Americans, African-Americans were angry over the news of more government 
spending on weaponry instead of social issues. In several cities, rallies took place to 
protest the news. They opposed the neutron bomb and other nuclear developments 
from the start. Not only did they dislike the development of mass murder weapons in 
general, they were also convinced that the money spent on the development of the 
weaponry could better be spent on improving their communities. Living in poor 
neighbourhoods, they found it unacceptable that many millions of dollars were being 
put in the nuclear arsenal instead of in improving the daily life of America’s own 
ordinary citizens.60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Minutes of the FOR National Council meeting, Apr. 16-19, 1978, F.O.R. Program for the Year 
Ahead, Fellowship 44 (1978) 15, Box 8, Series A-2, FOR (U.S.) Records. 
59 1976-1984 File on the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), box 451, War Resisters 
International archives, International Institute of Social History. 
60 Intondi, African Americans Against the Bomb, 88. 
	   27	  
 In the year prior to the Washington Post article there had already been some 
resistance to the nuclear policy. September 1976 was marked by one of the greatest 
anti-nuclear protest marches in the American history. The War Resisters League 
(WRL), a nationwide anti-nuclear group, organised the Continental Walk for 
Disarmament and Social Justice to bring their disarmament protest from town to 
town.61 The WRL had divisions all across the country, with several divisions 
predominantly formed by black members.62 Being regarded as one of the first major 
protests in the new wave of anti-nuclear efforts, the motives for organizing this march 
provide a starting point for looking into the motives of the black anti-nuclear 
protesters further onwards. The protesters believed that if they could unite various 
races and sexes, they would be able to alter US nuclear policy. African-Americans 
who participated in the march stated that the United States was killing its own citizens 
by spending money on weaponry instead of on better living conditions.63 
 The anti-nuclear motivations did not only come from private persons. 
President Carter’s own UN ambassador, the African-American Andrew Young, 
opposed the neutron bomb and the nuclear weapons policy from the beginning of his 
appointment in 1977. Together with other politicians and grassroots activists he 
eventually managed to cancel the further development of the neutron bomb in 1978. 
But as Intondi states, ‘For Young, the connection between nuclear disarmament and 
the black freedom struggle was much deeper.’64 And he was not the only one who felt 
that way. In 1976, numerous anti-nuclear groups gathered on hearing the 
announcement by the UN that the major nuclear powers agreed on having a Special 
Session on Disarmament. Various spiritual and human rights groups such as ‘Witness 
for Survival’ organised protests in support of the session on disarmament. Their aim 
was ‘to highlight the discrepancy between the elaborate sums spent on nuclear 
weapons and the paltry sums allocated for the poor.’65  
2.2 Institutionalisation of the anti-nuclear movements 
As addressed in the introduction already, David S. Meyer provides a theory of 
Political Opportunity Structures, which provides an explanation on why the black 	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anti-nuclear protesters had the opportunity to reach a wider audience by protesting for 
their cause from 1976 onwards. This opportunity could as well enable the movements 
to institutionalize further to be able to be better organized and thus secure their 
progress more tightly.66 As mentioned in the introduction, Political Opportunity 
Structures According to Meyer, protesters tend to search for the most direct lines to be 
influential if they are opposed to a certain policy. People who are farther away from 
the decision makers are more dependent on their decisions and are less likely to make 
a difference to the policy without having to use extreme methods to draw the 
attention. This also applies to the black anti-nuclear protesters. Because of this, the 
political choices that the protesters made were based upon the distance to the decision 
makers and their response to the protest actions. As Meyer notices, groups that 
successfully challenged the government in the past did usually not make a real 
political change, but ‘emphasized entrance to and legitimation within the political 
system’. 67 They managed to become part of the political system and legitimized their 
problems for the politicians who were able to make a change for them. Because of 
this, it is important to look at the institutionalization of the black anti-nuclear 
protesters to see whether they were able to step into the political space that came into 
existence during the détente period. 
 A great share of anti-nuclear organisations, not only in the United States but in 
other Western countries as well, belonged to an umbrella organization called the War 
Resisters International (WRI). The WRI was founded in 1921 in the Netherlands, and 
the previously WRL was the large American chapter of the WRI. The WRL had a 
large share of black members, especially in the Southern States. Working together 
with various other anti-nuclear groups such as the FOR they were actively trying to 
build an institutionalized and well-organized movement. The WRL had ties with 
African-American human rights movements and anti-racist movements as well. For 
example, from 1979 onwards, the WRL was part of the National Anti-Klan Network 
(NAKN). This was a group organizing against the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and 
against racism in general. This cooperation with the NAKN was actively shown by 
the WRL in their newsletters.68 The AFSC also was an umbrella organisation for 
other, smaller anti-nuclear and human rights movements. Being one of the oldest 	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protest movements in the United States, the AFSC was an already-existing stable 
institution. Awarded the Noble Peace Price in 1947, the AFSC had already proven 
their effectiveness decades before the 1970’s.69  
 For some of these older protest movements, the end of the Vietnam War 
jeopardised their existence. Although organisations like the WRL, AFSC and FOR 
had grown very large during the war, they were dependent on the continuing 
willingness of their members to mobilise. As becomes clear from letters by the FOR 
and the WRL, the movements lost members with the ending of the war. The letters 
that were being sent to members and friends of the organisations give a clear insight 
in the situation of the movements. The WRL was actively collecting money because 
all capital had been put into obtaining a new headquarters, to properly establish the 
organisation. In combination with the amount of people who unsubscribed at the end 
of the Vietnam War, this resulted in an urgent need for money.70 The decision to 
prioritise the abolition of nuclear weaponry caused the number of members to 
increase once again.  
 The cooperation of politicians and important church leaders provides an 
indication of to what extent the anti-nuclear groups were embedded in the political 
and ecclesiastical institutions. Some powerful members of the anti-nuclear movement 
managed to successfully raise the issue of nuclear policy, whilst making a connection 
with social injustice for minority groups. Andrew Young was probably the highest 
government politician that openly sympathised with the black anti-nuclear protesters 
and even helped them. As he stated in a 1985 interview, he was actively advocating 
non-violent action against nuclear weaponry. Before starting his career in politics, 
Young had cooperated with various black human rights groups as Executive Director 
of the SCLC. Being in a powerful position as US ambassador at the UN from 1977 
onwards, Young had a vital role in organising some of the anti-nuclear initiatives.  
 American politics included many supporters of nuclear disarmament like 
Young. Not all were so outspoken in their opinions about disarmament, but there 
certainly people who were opposed to the increasing nuclear stockpile. High officials 
like Zbigniew Brezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, were not 
entirely negative about the protest movements. Brezinski stated in an interview that 	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the nuclear groups had been helpful on several issues. He had to admit that the 
movements had been annoying sometimes, but in general they did good work in 
addressing problems regarding the nuclear policy.71 
There were also important figures in ecclesiastical institutions that supported 
the anti-nuclear movement. Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen announced that, like 
many others, he would support the anti-nuclear movement by refusing to pay taxes. 
According to Hunthausen, the continuing nuclear arms race provided a situation in 
which it had almost become an obligation to disobey the law in order to show that you 
did not support the on-going development of nuclear weaponry.72 
 Having well known supporters of anti-nuclear policy in vital positions, the 
black anti-nuclear movement was able to strengthen their initiatives. People like 
Young and Hunthausen provided an important example for many protesters, by 
showing that there were people in the political establishment who supported the fight 
against the government policy. According to David S. Meyer, such people managed to 
bring the anti-nuclear protest to the foreground once more, adding to the widespread 
support for the movement during the second half of the détente period: ‘Only when 
elite actors have legitimated criticism of government policy have strong movements 
emerged.’73 
 Various anti-nuclear movements established themselves as publishing 
companies, besides their regular activist activities. Organisations like the MNS and 
FOR issued journals, newsletters, articles and books on their activism.74 The MNS 
sent out flyers advertising their new publications to the public. They included various 
books on human rights, black rights, gay rights and the anti-nuclear protests.75 By 
doing so, they managed to create another stream of income that was not based on gifts 
from the members, but on sales of literature. This would benefit the stability of their 
income and their ability to create a secure institutionalized basis. 
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 Another important method for the anti-nuclear movements to grow and to 
establish a nationwide network of institutes was by advocating the establishment of 
local protests. Both the FOR and the WRL used various media to raise awareness for 
the importance of establishing local networks. Information was distributed on events 
organised by the anti-nuclear groups and a great share of flyers by the WRL, FOR, 
AFSC, MNS and other groups provided instruction on how to find your own local 
anti-nuclear movement.76 Since most black anti-nuclear protesters were part of larger 
anti-nuclear movements, to them this was an important aspect of their protests. The 
FOR went very far in this, sending even whole instruction kits to high schools across 
the country with instructions. Sometimes they sent representatives of the movement 
as well to give lectures on starting a movement as well.77 Finding a local movement 
was for many anti-nuclear movements a way of connecting people to their 
organisation. Such local movements would consist of a smaller group of people, 
taking actions in their own surroundings. A way of doing so was for instance by 
showing students how to organize lectures on their own schools, or letting them 
declare a nuclear free zone in their own back yard. With this, people could show their 
discontent on a small scale, but combined, all these smaller initiatives could lead to 
larger support for the anti-nuclear movements as a whole.78  
 Not only the FOR and the WRL addressed the importance of starting local 
initiatives. This was done by almost all anti-nuclear groups in the second half of the 
détente period. MNS, an anti-nuclear group in the northeast of the United States, was 
even based solely on local initiatives. In various flyers, they called themselves ‘a 
network of autonomous groups working for nonviolent social change.’79 Only after 
the détente period ended by the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1981, 
the MNS started putting effort in strengthening the already existing collectives, 
instead of just focusing on creating more local initiatives. The MNS was a movement 
that actively promoted social change by advocating the abolishment of nuclear 
weapons and ending unequal treatment for black people and women. By educating 	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people about their rights, and encouraging them to spread this message further, the 
MNS tried to initiate a non-violent revolution.80  
 A similar development happened in 1977 with groups like WSP and the 
Mobilization for Survival. WSP gave a great deal of attention to the education of 
women from all races and cultures concerning the importance of nuclear 
disarmament.81 Mobilization for Survival organized over 200 teach-inns, which drew 
thousands of people. With these teach inns, the Mobilization for Survival was 
informing people about the dangers of nuclear weaponry and linking this to the 
importance of improving human needs.82 
2.3 Protest methods 
The black-anti nuclear protesters in the United States used a wide variety of methods 
to show their dissatisfaction with the American nuclear policy. This section will deal 
with the most important protest methods and their implications.  
 Coming together and forming a movement can already be regarded as a 
method of protesting nuclear policy. This is here taken for granted, and researching 
the formation of the various anti-nuclear movements is not the focus of this study. 
The analysis of the protest methods that have been used by the protesters involves 
dividing the methods into two sub-categories. The first one is protest methods that are 
based on a sense of civil disobedience. For a lot of black-anti nuclear groups, 
opposing the law could be a useful tool for raising awareness of the injustices of 
government policy. Movements like the WRL and the AFSC were continuously 
encouraging their members to engage in actions in which disobeying the law was the 
main concern.83 But not all protest methods were based on civil disobedience. There 
were also various methods that happened within the rules of the law, or with special 
permission. These methods will be the second category in this paragraph.  
 One of the most common methods to protest nuclear policy was a form of civil 
disobedience by marching. Anti-nuclear marches already happened in the 1960’s, and 
were still commonly organised through the 1970’s and 1980’s. As previously 
mentioned, at the start of the new wave of anti-nuclear protests in 1976, one of the 
largest marches in American history was held: The Continental Walk for 	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Disarmament and Social Justice. The march was a combined effort of various anti-
nuclear groups, but initiated by the WRL. From San Francisco, New Orleans and 
Boston, people started walking in large processions throughout the whole country, 
ending in Washington DC.84 The SCLC, a black human rights group founded by 
Martin Luther King Jr., organised the ‘Walk’ in a few Southern states, where the 
majority of the protesters was black. The SCLC and WRL stated in a call to various 
peace leaders at the beginning of the march, that they were marching ‘to demonstrate 
how global and domestic and economic problems are interconnected with militarism 
and the causes of war’.85 The WRL and the SCLC were convinced that issues of 
unemployment and inequity were interconnected with the public money being spent 
on nuclear weaponry. Pictures of the end of the march, in Washington DC, show both 
black and white people walking together and demonstrating against the nuclear 
policy. They were openly protesting both the nuclear policy and black human rights.86  
 Although the SCLC stated its intention to conduct peaceful protests only, 
some protesters were arrested. For the African American protesters it was very 
important to publicly state their disagreement with the nuclear weapons program. 
During the march, being black wasn’t easy as well. Although marching was not 
forbidden in the United States, for the African American protesters it was clear that 
this was the reason that they were being arrested. As SCLC’s information director 
Tyrone Brooks stated in news magazine Jet, the protesters were very much dedicated 
to the cause: ‘The walk from Georgia to Washington took five months and we were 
jailed in six states for marching.’87 That is why marching had such an appeal to the 
black protesters. They were openly protesting and simultaneously showing that they 
would not accept on-going discrimination. They were able to show all across the 
country that they were black people who opposed both the nuclear policy and the 
social implications of this policy. As Andrew Young stated in an interview, the black 
protesters in the Southern US were conducting a non-violent way of protesting, but 
this was often met with a violent response from the police. The Southern protests 	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included many young people and women who were often treated very aggressively: 
‘for a group of unsuspecting women and children to be suddenly fired upon with 
teargas and then a group of big burly Alabama State Troopers start beating them with 
billy clubs, ah, just produced a sheer mass panic.’88 Clearly, the protests did not 
always evolve as peaceful as intended.  
 The black anti-nuclear protesters used marching as a tactic more often. To 
them, it provided a helpful tool to bring their message to a greater public. Although 
the 1976 walk for disarmament never received the expected media attention, in May 
1977 the black anti-nuclear protesters had more success. Witness for Survival 
organised various events that eventually lead up to the huge demonstration in New 
York City, as a response to the previously mentioned United Nations Special Session 
on Disarmament.89 For the black anti-nuclear protesters, this was a good moment to 
show their dissatisfaction with the implications of the nuclear program for human 
rights and to prove the societal cogency of the movement. The Witness for Survival 
movement was formed by local leaders from various different religions who tried to 
draw attention to the poor living conditions of large groups of Americans. In doing so 
they wanted to make clear why the nuclear developments should be stopped. Before 
the protest march started, the religious leaders had visited poor neighbourhoods in 
New York to show the poor living conditions to the press.90 On the day of the 
protests, tens of thousands of people walked through New York, eventually coming 
together in front of the United Nations headquarters. Although the special session on 
disarmament did not influence the nuclear policy of the United States, the protesters 
had shown that they were able to unite different races and classes for a shared goal: 
nuclear disarmament. 
 But marching was not the only instrument used to bring anti-nuclear protesters 
together. There were other forms of mobilizing the masses that were successful as 
well. The female anti-nuclear group WSP was very active in the second half of the 
1970’s and had a large share of African American followers. After hearing of Carter’s 
plans for the neutron bomb, the WSP organized a benefit show in New York to raise 
money for education about the dangers of the weapon. The figurehead of the 
campaign was the black actress and Broadway performer Vinie Burrows. The WSP 	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had already protested against the nuclear policy for years, but with the benefit show, 
the group was not only protesting, but was also actively working against the specific 
policies of President Carter. The group informed women about a change in the law, 
which made the transportation of radioactive materials through city centres more 
common.91 The benefit show was for them a way to mobilize the masses and at the 
same time provide an instrument for the members to spread the word of the dangers of 
nuclear weaponry by informing others.   
 Earlier in 1977, female protesters had held a similar gathering to mobilize 
their members. The WSP was part of a National Women’s Conference, organized by 
Congresswoman Bella Abzug. Present at the conference were women from all 
American states and regions. Photographs from the conference show black and white 
women, protesting government policies together by holding up signs during the 
conference.92 For these women, being from different backgrounds, protesting together 
and addressing the dangers of the nuclear policy altogether was a major step. The 
women’s protest groups were actively supporting equal rights for both black and 
white, and men and women. 
  In 1980 and 1981, a nation-wide protest group called Women’s Pentagon 
Action (WPA) also addressed the issues of race and nuclear policy among their 
reasons to protest. The WPA issued a Unity Statement, in which they drafted their 
reasons for protesting the nuclear policy. The document, which was decorated with 
little drawings of white and black women, addressed the huge costs of government 
spending on the nuclear policy. The document linked this spending directly to the big 
unemployment rates under black and Hispanic youth, and inequality in general. 
According to the WPA, the authority that nuclear power had given the men in charge 
of ruling the United States make them more racist: ‘Racism has offered privilege and 
convenience; women often fail to see that they themselves have bent to the unnatural 
authority and violence of men in government (…). We refuse that separation. We 
need each other’s knowledge and anger in our common struggle against the builders 
of jails and bombs.’93  
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For the black anti-nuclear protesters, another major way of showing their 
dissatisfaction was by refusing to pay taxes. This form of civil disobedience was of 
great importance for the black protesters since one of their main arguments for 
nuclear abolition was the fact that the money being spent on the nuclear program 
could be better spent on the poor black neighbourhoods. Jim Forest, secretary general 
of the FOR, stated in a letter to President Ford on April 15, 1976 that the families of 
the members of the FOR would stop paying taxes. Using a biblical reference to the 
story of Jesus being forced to the cross by soldiers with swords, Forest declared that 
they would not contribute to buying the ‘swords’ of their own day, and neither did 
they want other people to have to use these ‘swords’ in their name. Jesus had told his 
disciple Peter, who tried to defend Jesus, to put away his sword. Forest echoed that 
message. On Holy Thursday, Christians still yearly remembered these events. In 
1976, Holy Thursday turned out to be on the same day as tax day in 1976, and Forest 
addressed this coincidence to show how terrible the position was of many poor 
Americans. As he stated, ‘The cost of our defence system is not simply the 100-bilion 
in the present budget, or the 112-billion for next year. It is in the cities left to decay. 
(…) It is the cutting off of poor families from food stamps and other vital services’.94  
 There were other cases of civil disobedience by refusing to pay taxes. In 1978, 
various church groups like the AFSC, Church of the Bretheren and the Menonites, 
involving hundreds of thousands of protesters, issued a statement similar to the one by 
the FOR. According to local newspapers, the members of the church groups disagreed 
with the increased government spending on the military: ‘Are we going to pray for 
peace, and pay for war?’95 Tax refusal remained an important method of protesting 
the nuclear policy and military spending in general throughout the whole Cold War 
era.  
 The political efforts of the black anti-nuclear protest movements were an 
important method to influence the nuclear policy of the government. Political efforts 
can be regarded as efforts that were being made by black anti-nuclear protesters to 
lobby for political change. As mentioned before, even in American politics there were 
people who protested the nuclear policy. Andrew Young was a great example of 	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somebody who was close to the President, but still opposed the policy of increasing 
the nuclear stockpile. The Washington newspaper Washington Afro-American stated 
that Young was ‘black America’s most influential person at the White House’, and a 
‘political martyr’.96 Young had managed to put the issues of the black anti-nuclear 
movement on the political agenda, even when this didn’t benefit his own political 
career. In 1979, Young was asked by President Carter to resign due to a disagreement, 
but he successfully recommend another fighter of the black anti-nuclear cause to 
President Carter: Donald F. McHenry. Just as Young, McHenry would continue the 
humanitarian work for the black community that Young had started, but as Carter 
hoped, would ‘melt furious black criticism of him for the ouster of Young who was 
black America’s most influential person at the White House’.97 The efforts by Young, 
in combination with the anti-nuclear protests, had resulted in the abolishment of the 
policy of developing the neutron bomb. At first, not many national security officials 
knew about the development of the neutron bomb, but due to the efforts of the 
protesters this matter became known to a wider public. Due to this, President Carter 
stated that the news had ‘generated a great deal of controversy’, and thus decided to 
cancel the production.98 
 The black anti-nuclear movements tried to lobby as well to be able to 
accomplish a change in government policy. Clear examples of such efforts were the 
letters that were written by leaders of the anti-nuclear movements to politicians. 
Letters were written to the President, such as the earlier mentioned letter by FOR 
secretary general Jim Forest, but as well to foreign leaders. For example, an anti-
nuclear statement by the WRL was sent to various heads of state such as Saddam 
Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini to show the dissatisfaction with nuclear progress in 
various countries outside the United States as well.99 In these letters, the anti-nuclear 
protesters provided the heads of state with arguments to sign nuclear non-proliferation 
treaties or encourage them to stop their efforts in developing nuclear weaponry. The 
letters were also used as statements to make announcements of upcoming protests and 
to indicate how widely the anti-nuclear protests were supported. Issuing such 	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statements was an activity conducted by almost all anti-nuclear groups.100 The 
archives of the WRI, the international umbrella organisation of the WRL, show 
clearly how widely certain statements were supported. An international declaration on 
disarmament issued by the WRI in 1981 was signed by hundreds of organizations to 
show their dissatisfaction with the American nuclear policy.101 Each of these 
signatures under the declaration represented a larger group, and thus the WRI was 
able to show widespread support across society. The real success of the declaration 
remains unclear since it is not possible to attribute any changes directly to these 
efforts. ‘Success’ can be claimed in that these messages provided a clear signal of 
how extensive the protests against the nuclear policy were. Showing publicly how 
widespread the support was for the anti-nuclear cause could influence government 
policies since it became harder to ignore the protests, as the example of the neutron 
bomb had shown.  
2.4 Message & Rhetoric 
As described in the previous paragraphs, the black anti-nuclear protesters had their 
own motives to protest the American nuclear policy. Due to this, they had a specific 
message as well, which was often different from the message of other protesters. As a 
black clergyman in the protest stated: ‘We are now turning out one nuclear bomb in 
the U.S. every 8 hours, while every hour eight families die of starvation’.102 This 
illustrates the most important message by the black anti-nuclear protesters. To 
illustrate this main notion, the protesters used various messages and symbols during 
their protests.  
 Iconic symbols known from the transnational anti-nuclear movement and 
symbols that relate to the United States in particular were being used in external 
communication. The archives of these materials show that they used a relatively small 
variety of symbols to signify the cause of nuclear disarmament.103 American flags, 	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white doves, and Uncle Sam were depicted in flyers and posters by for instance the 
WRL, FOR and the AFSC.104 During various protests, people even made meters-high 
puppets, depicting white doves and the statue of liberty.105 On buttons, banners and t-
shirts, the protesters made these symbols publicly visible as well. Such visual sources 
are of great importance for getting a clear overview of the message that the black anti-
nuclear protesters wanted to share and the rhetoric that they used. Pictures of protests, 
flyers, magazines, buttons, and T-shirts all give a clear sign of what the protesters 
aimed for: the abolishment of the US nuclear weapons policy. By using typical 
American elements in their communication, the protesters spread a message that 
although they opposed their government’s nuclear policy, they were Americans. This 
policy was according to them not in line with the American values and human rights. 
For the black protesters this was an important notion, because they were American 
but a minority as well. They wanted to be heard and to bring their issue of being poor 
due to the spending on nuclear weaponry to a wider public. The American symbols 
were often used in a mocking way. On flyers issued by the FOR in 1978, you could 
for instance see a picture of Uncle Sam, with on his hat the text: ‘In arms we trust?’ 
The FOR flyers stated that ‘The Department of Defence says we must spend hundreds 
of billions of dollars to buy security. Others think that what we are buying is poverty 
and the chance of annihilation. Look at the figures in this folder and decide for 
yourself.’106  
 Another iconic symbol that was often being used by the protesters was a 
drawing of the planet earth. This symbol was used to show that the black anti-nuclear 
protesters wanted to unite people to address a common cause. The WRL for instance 
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used a lot of such drawings to show that they were willing to unite different races and 
religions to protest all together.107  
 The black protesters also made use of their own specific symbols. Quite often, 
the protesters referred to famous black human rights activists such as Martin Luther 
King and Malcolm X. These men had fought the nuclear policy as well, in the 
previous wave of protests, and become icons for peace in the process. Since these 
men had a great influence in the human rights movements in the United States, and 
even died whilst fighting for their rights as black men, the protesters claimed they 
were continuing their fight. As Jim Forest stated about the anti-nuclear protests: ‘we 
honor Dr. Martin Luther King and all those others, black and white, who found in 
civil disobedience a way to dramatize the struggle against racism and the possibility 
of change coming about in a nonviolent way’.108 The WRL even issued flyers with a 
call for action that had a picture of Martin Luther King and the words: ‘Jobs Peace 
Freedom’, and below that: ‘We still have a dream’.109 They organized events annually 
to celebrate the birthday of King, clearly stated in the calendars that were sent to their 
members.110  
 There is no indication that the message or the rhetoric of the black anti-nuclear 
protesters significantly changed between 1976 and 1981. In 1977 there was more of 
an emphasis on the neutron bomb, which provided new input for the protesters. The 
issue of public money being spent on weapons instead of social improvements had 
been heard before, for instance during The Continental Walk for Disarmament, and 
this only became stronger in 1977 with the news on the neutron bomb. The main 
difference was that the protesters had another clear example of a money-consuming 
government project, which would make the position of black Americans even worse. 
But besides this slight change, the message of the protesters remained consistent. The 
humanitarian motivation of the protesters remained the most important aspect of the 
black anti-nuclear protests. In a large protest march in front of the White House in 
1980, the main message of the protesters was still the poverty of the black people in 	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the United States, which was according to them, partly caused by the investments in 
the nuclear programme. The chairman of the National Conference of Black Mayors, 
an organisation that took part in the protests, stated that ‘The nation’s poor and 
unemployed are out of work, out of hope, and out of cash.’111 The protesters accused 
the President of giving more attention to nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union 
than the well being of his own people.112  
 Not a real change in the message of the black anti-nuclear protesters, but 
merely a strengthening of the message occurred in 1981, after the election of Ronald 
Reagan as President of the United States. Reagan opposed every form of anti-nuclear 
protests and even called them communists and spies. He did not hide his plans to 
build up the nuclear stockpile even further.113  
2.5 Religion 
Religion was important as an inspiration for the anti-nuclear movements from the 
beginning. Faith was part of the motivation for the protests. Marches were often 
called ‘pilgrimages’, referring to pilgrims who walked for a religious cause.114 The 
white dove with an olive branch in its mouth, a symbol that was often used in anti-
nuclear protests, originates from Christian tradition as well. For the United States, this 
religious motivation went even further. The idea that the United States is a divine 
country and that its destiny is determined in a covenant with God is embedded in 
American history and culture.115 Because of this a big part of the black anti-nuclear 
protest movements was based on religious organisations. They saw it as their duty as 
Christians to bring peace to the country and oppose nuclear developments, and a lot of 
ecclesiastically organisations were humanitarian organisations as well. Opposing 
nuclear weaponry from a religious pacifist point of view added to the idea that the 
black anti-nuclear protesters had a great humanitarian motivation, as living conditions 
were often worse than the conditions of white Americans, as shown in chapter 1. The 
religious anti-nuclear movements considered it their duty to support the poor, and in 
this case, nuclear policy only increased poverty.116 	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 For black churches, the religious involvement in the anti-nuclear movement 
was of great importance. As Christian organisations, they considered it their duty to 
resist nuclear developments in order to stand up for the interests of the poor black 
people in the United States. Due to this, church groups and Christian ministers were 
often the initiators of anti-nuclear protests.117 Groups such as AFSC, FOR, SCLC, 
STO, MFS and MNS were based on religious values, and operated in the light of that 
principle. Together these organisations represented a big part of the black protesters. 
Other organisations such as the WRL, the Clamshell Alliance and SANE were based 
on secular pacifist roots, but worked together with the religious organisations. The 
fact that many black anti-nuclear protesters were represented by religious 
organisations had an impact on their motivations for protest. They were often willing 
to conduct their protests in a peaceful manner, which resulted in peaceful protest 
methods such as marching or issuing statements.  
 The Southern part of the Continental Walk on Disarmament, that had the 
largest percentage of African Americans, was organised by the SCLC and a few other 
Christian organisations, which walked for the well being of their fellow Christians.118 
Many more protests were conducted for similar goals. In 1977 and 1978 many major 
protests with large amounts of African American protesters were conducted from a 
religious viewpoint. MFS, consisting of hundreds of peace and religious groups, held 
hundreds of gatherings and teach-ins to address the dangers of the development of 
nuclear weaponry. Local churches played an important role in the founding of local 
anti-nuclear movements, since church buildings were often the sites of gatherings of 
anti-nuclear activists. As Coretta Scott King, wife of the late Martin Luther King Jr., 
stated prior to the 1978 protests in support of the United Nations Special Session on 
Disarmament: ‘We must change this reality. The religious community must raise a 
passionate cry, end our complacency, and act against the threat of nuclear 
destruction.’119 Not much later, the various religious groups started protesting under 
the earlier mentioned name Witness for Survival. Religious leaders went into 
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impoverished neighbourhoods to draw attention to the poverty of many Americans in 
contrast to the money being spent on nuclear weaponry.120  
 Besides church groups who initiated anti-nuclear protests, a great share of 
individual African American religious leaders participated in the anti-nuclear protests. 
Clergymen and representatives from various church organisations often took the lead 
in the protests from a religious viewpoint. As the president of the National Council of 
Churches (NCC), the largest church council in the United States, stated in a statement 
prior to a big protest in 1980: ‘Jesus Christ stands in direct opposition to everything 
nuclear weapons represent.’121 In previous years, the NCC had issued various similar 
statements, making clear that they directly opposed the nuclear policy of the United 
States.122 Other black clergymen such as Martin Luther King Jr., James Orange, 
Bernard Lee and Herbert Daughtry had taken a major role in various black anti-
nuclear protests throughout the country.  
 As becomes clear, the black anti-nuclear protests were heavily influenced by 
religious motivations. This was also displayed in the protest rhetoric and symbols.  
2.6 Spatial relations 
Since this thesis is set to provide a first start in an intercontinental analysis of black 
anti-nuclear protesters, it is important to highlight the most important international 
partners and associate groups of the American and South African black anti-nuclear 
groups. Most allies have been already mentioned in previous paragraphs, so this 
paragraph provides a short overview of the most important allies to be able to provide 
a clear insight in the international relations. The black anti-nuclear protesters in the 
United States were in direct contact with other anti-nuclear groups around the world. 
As well, they had close contacts with various human rights- and religious groups. 
 The AFSC, WRL and the FOR found it important to spread their anti-nuclear 
message across the American country borders. These organisations held close contact 
with anti-nuclear protesters in the Soviet Union. In correspondence between the anti-
nuclear protesters, it becomes clear that they were working together to stress the 
importance of a declining nuclear stockpile to ensure that humanitarian needs are 	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being funded more properly. The AFSC was in close contact with Soviet anti-nuclear 
groups to be able to discuss both military and civilian nuclear energy use. Not only 
letters were sent, there were even members of the WRL who visited members of the 
Russian anti-nuclear groups.123 Since the Soviet Union was the second largest nuclear 
power in the world, and the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States 
made it impossible to abolish nuclear weaponry, the contacts with protesters there 
were of great importance. Only by a mutual agreement a change could be made. So 
together the protesters spoke of ways to put pressure on their governments and end 
the nuclear racism. 
 The anti-nuclear protesters in South Africa can be regarded as an ally of the 
African American protesters in the United States. The American anti-nuclear 
protesters were in touch with South African movements because they were all against 
apartheid and as well against the uranium mining that made the nuclear developments 
in both countries possible. As Intondi mentions, for the African American protesters, 
the issues with the white minority government in South Africa were of importance as 
well. It showed that colonialism and nuclear policy were linked.124 American black 
action groups such as Blacks Against Nukes and The Washington Office on Africa 
were lobbying and campaigning against collaboration between the United States and 
South Africa. They were opposed to apartheid and valued all efforts made against the 
white minority regime. In their opinion, ‘South Africa is an important source for 
uranium, mined by blacks earning low wages under extremely unhealthy 
conditions.’125 These protest groups were opposing the discrimination that was 
brought upon black people by nuclear developments in both the United States as in 
South Africa. In their opinion, protesting the collaboration between the two countries 
was the only way of doing so. The United States’ support to South Africa increased 
racial discrimination of the black population because they would have to be in the 
uranium mines and the apartheid regime could keep their power and status alive. And 
the uranium that was provided to the United States by South Africa kept the United 
States’ nuclear programme running. 
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 The international ties between the African Americans and the anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa are not included in this overview. Although the African 
Americans did support the abolishment of apartheid and the ending of the South 
African nuclear program, this is not part of the United States’ black anti-nuclear 
movement, nor of the South African black anti-nuclear movement. These movements 
were against apartheid in general, not just against the South African and United 
States’ nuclear policy. The nuclear policy was not one of their spearheads. That is 
why these ties are not taken into account in this overview. 
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Chapter 3: The South African Case 
 
3.1 Intro: the motives of the South African anti-nuclear movement 
The South African anti-nuclear movement was closely connected to the large anti-
apartheid movement in South Africa and should thus be looked into in the context of 
the anti-apartheid movement. Just as in the United States, the abolishment of the 
nuclear programme was not a loose objective, but it was connected to other 
humanitarian and political goals. The protesters often wanted to address a broader 
framework of problems. The black anti-nuclear protesters had a greater whole of anti-
discrimination objectives.  
 The South African anti-nuclear protest movement was much smaller than the 
movement in the United States in 1976. In South Africa, the whole anti-nuclear 
movement seems to be closely tied to the anti-Apartheid movement since the nuclear 
developments were mainly negative for the black South African majority. The 
movement itself did not consist of many different groups as in the United States. But 
the few groups that did participate in the anti-nuclear protests were large and 
complex.  
 Meyer’s theory of Political Opportunity Structures is also applicable to the 
South African black anti-nuclear movement and thus provides a good basis for some 
parts of the analysis of this movement as well. Just as in the American case study, the 
various options that the protesters had, and the particular manners they decided to use 
to protest the nuclear policy of their government can be explained by their political 
opportunities. The South African protesters conducted different and more violent 
means of protest, which can be explained by the theory of Political Opportunity 
Structures. Because the South African protesters were subjective to the racial laws of 
the apartheid, they were not able to get in contact with the white minority 
government. According to Meyer, people look for the most direct means to gain 
influence on the political processes, and for the black anti-nuclear protesters this was 
by acts of violence.126 For the American protesters this was less necessary since the 
African-Americans already managed to have spokesmen in the American political 
system and thus enlarged their political opportunities already. Their success could be 
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achieved by political means, whilst the South African protesters had no such means to 
make a change in the nuclear policy. 
 As in the United States, in South Africa the black anti-nuclear movements 
were closely connected to human rights activities. For the black protesters, the atomic 
weaponry of their governments was a symbol of oppression because it even worsened 
the bad living conditions of the black population and affirmed the power of the white 
government. They spoke of a ‘racist nuclear bomb’, because they saw the weapons as 
an extension of the racist government.127 But nevertheless the South African black 
anti-nuclear movement had a lot of differences compared to the United States. 
Amongst other things, due to the racist legislation of South Africa, the black 
protesters were not able to show their dissatisfaction in the same way as the American 
protesters. 
 One of the main actors in the South African anti-nuclear movement was the 
African National Congress (ANC). Founded in 1912, the ANC was fighting against 
apartheid and the oppression of black South Africans. The ANC was banned in South 
Africa from 1960 onwards and thus operated as an illegal organisation. They were 
supported by the Soviet Union because they had communist affiliates as well. From 
1978 onwards, the ANC issued a new policy against the white minority government, 
based on the objective to ‘weakening the enemy’s grip on his reins of political, 
economic, social and military power, by a combination of political and military 
action.’128 In essence this new policy mainly caused an increased amount of violent 
actions and acts of sabotage. Most of these actions were committed by the armed 
department of the ANC, called Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), or Spear of the Nation.129 
Besides that, in 1979 a highly classified MK Special Operations Unit (SOU) was 
founded. This small unit was supposed to initiate strategic attacks in order to limit the 
white minority government in military and economic developments, such as 
sabotaging the nuclear power installation.130 As the ANC stated, they were opposing 
the nuclear development of the South African government because this would provide 	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the white minority government with greater power in the Southern part of Africa. 
Even without using the nuclear weaponry the government would be able to put 
pressure on other nations if they would threaten the apartheid regime, which would 
result in the prolongation of the violation of black human rights. Being motivated by 
their strife to end the apartheid regime, the abolishment of the nuclear policy provided 
an important factor in obtaining the final goals of the ANC.131 
 Besides the protests from the ANC, the black anti-nuclear movement consisted 
largely of religious organisations such as the earlier mentioned AACC. This 
organisation had close ties with the ANC since they had shared goals in their battle 
against the apartheid regime. As well, since the AACC was a fellowship that 
represented hundreds of churches throughout Africa, it was closely related to various 
other church groups who supported the anti-nuclear efforts. Not all of these church 
groups were based in South Africa. Churches in neighbouring countries also opposed 
the nuclear aspirations of the South African government since they felt threatened by 
the growing power of their neighbouring country and were as well negatively 
influenced by the existence of the Apartheid regime. 
 Right after hearing the statements by the ANC on the nuclear capabilities of 
South Africa, the AACC started their opposition against these developments. Being 
already active in the struggle for liberation from the apartheid regime, the AACC was 
closely tied to human rights issues and regarded the nuclear capabilities as a grave 
threat to black human rights. As AACC Chairman John Gatu addressed in a telegram 
to German bishop Helmut Class, they took the matter very seriously: ‘This 
development will serve certainly to reinforce iniquitous apartheid policies of South 
Africa and we warn that this could lead to most dangerous escalation of the racial 
conflict in South Africa into possible full scale nuclear war on our continent’.132  
 In short, the motive for the black anti-nuclear protesters to oppose the South 
African nuclear program was dual. They had an internal and an external reason to 
protest. In the first place they opposed the developments because it could be used ‘as 
a means of intimidating black South Africans and lessening the risk of internal unrest 
while boosting the morale of the beleaguered whites.’133 And in the second place, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Statement by Oliver Tambo at the International Conference on the EEC and South Africa, The 
African National Congress (online archive) <http://www.anc.org.za/content/statement-oliver-tambo-
international-conference-eec-and-south-africa> [04.05.2017] 
132 The Nuclear Conspiracy, All Africa Conference of Churches, 1. 
133 Van Wyk, ‘Nuclear terrorism in Africa’, 58.  
	   49	  
opposed the developments because the South African government would now be able 
to put pressure on regimes that were a potential threat to the apartheid regime. As 
John Gatu stated, ‘the whole continent is now subjected to nuclear blackmail.’134 
3.2 The Institutionalisation of the Movement 
The AACC was very well institutionalized as a fellowship of churches that had 
affiliates throughout the whole continent of Africa. Their headquarters was based in 
the city centre of Nairobi, Kenya, and there were various other bases throughout the 
whole continent of Africa. The fact that the AACC was a religious organisation made 
a solid institutional base easy in a Christian country like South Africa. Consisting of 
many churches, the religious organisations formed a widespread network of 
communities that were able to come together in already existing church buildings. 
The AACC had around 115 of member churches throughout the whole African 
continent. Many of them were missionary churches such as Anglican or Baptist 
churches, but they had as well independent churches such as the African Brotherhood 
Church. Besides that, many Christian communities throughout Africa were members 
of the AAC. In South Africa, one of its members was the South Africa Council of 
Churches, of whom reverend Desmond Tutu was the Secretary General. Various bible 
societies were also part of the AACC, such as The Bible Society of South Africa.135   
 The AACC was, and still is, a hierarchical organization with various levels of 
decision-making. The highest authority is the General Assembly. This assembly 
meets every five years to outline the policy for the coming five years. As well it elects 
The General Committee, which meets every 18 months. In its turn, the General 
Committee elects The Executive Committee that executes the policy made on the 
higher levels but is also allowed to be act on behalf of the higher levels. Under the 
Executive Committee there are two more departments, The Finance and Personnel 
Committee, and The General Secretariat, who run the daily policy and runs the offices 
from day to day.136 Being such a hierarchical organisation, the AACC managed to 
interfere in different levels of politics, both on a local city-to-city scale, but on a 
national and even international scale as well. Its highest officials, like chairman John 
Gatu, were involved not only in international ecclesiastical meetings, but they also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The Nuclear Conspiracy, All Africa Conference of Churches, v. 
135 Directory Repertoire of AACC Member Churches, All Africa Conference of Churches (Regional 
Office of Lome 1981) 12-13, 206, 213. 
136 Governance Structure, All Africa Conference of Churches (undated) <www.aacc-
ceta.org/en/about/governance-structure> [04.05.2017].  
	   50	  
were in close contact with politicians in for instance the NATO and the United 
Nations137 In a letter, written to John Gatu by the chairman of The Special Committee 
against Apartheid Jeanne Martin Cisse, The Special Committee pledged full support 
to the anti-nuclear actions taken by the AACC. They also stated that they looked 
forward to an even more increasing cooperation with the AACC. This letter was a 
response to letters by John Gatu, which brought news that was regarded as being quite 
important.138  
 One of the departments of the AACC that is not mentioned before was the 
Department of Faith and Selfhood of the Church. This department dealt with various 
issues regarding evangelism, theological research, training of church personnel and 
research for the church identity.139 One of the main goals of this department was 
‘Study, comment and dissemination of theological research and information from 
different Christian/Ecumenical bodies to churches in Africa’.140 Because of these 
goals, the AACC had almost 40 theological institutions for education on advanced 
and diploma level throughout the whole African continent. 18 of these institutions 
were located in South Africa. In addition, there were many institutions with a 
Certificate Level, according to the AACC, too many to count.141 These theological 
institutions strengthened the institutionalisation of the AACC, since they were not 
only present in the churches, but as well in universities and other educational 
institutions. Thereby, the AACC could broaden its network of support in academics 
circles.  
 Since the ANC was a political organisation it had a different way of 
institutionalizing and also had a different infrastructure from the AACC. But since the 
ANC was officially banned, and the MK was even regarded as a terrorist group, they 
could not participate in the national politics but instead had to build their politics and 
actions in illegality instead. Within the ANC, the National Executive Committee was 
and is the highest authority and is in charge of the ANC. The National Executive 
Committee can only be overruled by decisions being made in National Conferences. 
The National Executive Committee has dozens of subcommittees that help with the 
policy development and the execution of the daily tasks. On a provincial level, the 	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ANC has executive boards that will execute the policy made by the National 
Executive Committee on a provincial level.142 Just like the AACC, with this hierarchy 
the ANC was involved in different levels of the anti-nuclear protests. Not only was it 
present at international conferences from the NATO and the Socialist International, it 
could also operate on a provincial level and show its support for local initiatives and 
protests. 
 Within the South African government there was no support for the black anti-
nuclear movements. But this did not mean that there was no political support for the 
black anti-nuclear movement. As becomes clear from letters between the AACC and 
the Organisation of African Unity, there was a wide support from politicians. In South 
Africa itself these politicians came from the ANC, and although this was an illegal 
organization, they still could conduct their political activities on a level right below 
the national government.143 Being able to correspond with politicians from other 
countries, not only in Africa but also in European countries and the United States, the 
South African politicians received recognition for their political activities. This 
validated their role as politicians, despite their inability to participate in the national 
politics of South Africa.  
 Most of the black anti-nuclear protesters were Christians, and support from 
religious leaders was of great importance to them. John Gatu, chairman of the AACC 
was a clergyman himself and had been the General Secretary of the Presbyterian 
Church of East Africa. Leaders from the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa 
also related to the anti-nuclear cause of the AACC. As pastor and President of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southwest Africa Dr. J.Lukas de Vries wrote in 1976, 
that the church should be independent and should mediate between political parties 
and protesters. He opposed the nuclear policy and argued that the church should play 
a role in dismantling the nuclear programme.  
 Just like the American anti-nuclear movements, the AACC, ANC and MK had 
institutionalized themselves even further by finding their own publishing companies. 
By doing so they had a platform to publish their ideas on the government policies and 	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show their dissatisfaction to a wider public. For the ANC and MK this was of great 
importance, since they were regarded as illegal. By publishing their own works they 
could still spread their ideas. The AACC was able to publish their books and other 
printed materials themselves. For instance, they published policy programs of the 
AACC and books containing research studies of the issue of nuclear collaboration 
between South Africa and foreign countries.144 For the ANC, publishing its own 
books was much more difficult. The greater part of the ANC publications was funded 
and published by foreign supporters. It did publish their own statements and 
memorandums and later on started publishing its own magazines.  
3.3 Protest Methods 
The protest methods that were used by the black anti-nuclear protesters in South 
Africa can, just as their counterparts in the United States, be divided in acts of civil 
disobedience and other forms of protest. In theory, all actions by the ANC and the 
MK can be regarded as acts of civil disobedience since they were forbidden in South 
Africa. But to make the comparison with the American case study more valid I have 
chosen to regard only the actions that caused social unrest as acts of civil 
disobedience.   
 Sending out both letters and official statements was one of the main protest 
activities of the black anti-nuclear protesters in South Africa. For the ANC, being 
unheard in politics, this was one of the vital means of bringing their message to a 
wider public. For the AACC, being able to address a broad network of Christians 
worldwide, this was an easy manner of spreading their ideas on the developments of 
the South African nuclear programme. At the end of 1975, the ANC managed to 
publish secret documents on the collaborations between the South African 
government and Germany in the fields of nuclear power development. Already at that 
time it recognized the possible threat of this collaboration for the black South 
Africans. The message by the ANC was heard throughout the whole world and 
proved the success of this method. Newspaper mentions, and official statements by 
other countries that referred to the ANC statement showed this.145 As more news 
about the nuclear developments of South Africa became public, the ANC issued many 
more statements about their opinion on this issue, to various international institutions 	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such as the United Nations and the European Economic Community.146 This made 
them widely heard throughout the world. By issuing statements on the South African 
government policies to South Africans themselves, the ANC wanted to emphasise that 
a conflict was inevitable, but that the white minority government was the only party 
that could do something about the intensity of the conflict. The ANC wanted to show 
all South Africans, black and white, that South Africa was descending to an absolute 
low in its history. In a statement issued in 1976, ANC member Umntwana 
Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi drew attention to the growing power of the white minority 
government, and its refusal to accept the black majority as equal, made a revolution 
inevitable. The ANC tried to show that the black majority tried to protest peacefully, 
but that the government made this impossible: ‘It is entirely up to White South Africa 
whether the revolution that is unfolding will be peaceful or bloody’.147  
 For the AACC as well, already in 1976 it was of great importance to show its 
dissatisfaction about international collaborations with the South African government 
to improve its nuclear energy programme. The AACC issued statements as well, but 
was even more active in sending letters to affiliated parties and government 
authorities. In an official press release from August 18th, 1976, the AACC turned 
directly to the South African government and their Western allies. As they stated, the 
South African government had to ‘initiate immediately the machinery for dismantling 
of apartheid’, and the Western countries had to stop providing nuclear technology 
which ‘turned South Africa into an impregnable fortress of oppression’.148 
 But the AACC did not only direct themselves to political institutions. By 
sending letters to church communities throughout the whole world, the AACC 
managed to show their concerns about the nuclear developments in South Africa to 
other Christians. Having such a worldwide network to express their concerns, the 
board members of the AACC managed to get wide support for their cause from 
Christians throughout the whole world. In a letter to the Conference of European 
Churches in 1976, the AACC pointed out the danger of a possible cooperation 
between French industrial firms and the South African government. As becomes clear 
from their reply, the European churches were willing to draw the attention to this 	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cause: ‘We have decided to give the widest possible publicity to your cable and issue 
an appeal for such actions as may be possible.’149  
 But issuing statements was not the only means by which the black anti-nuclear 
protesters brought their issues to the attention of a larger public. The main methods 
that were used by the black anti-nuclear protesters were various forms of diplomacy. 
On August 23th, the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, shared the opinion of the 
ANC to the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid. According to Tambo, 
the European and American powers bolstered apartheid by supporting the white 
minority government ‘who value their self interest above human aspirations’.150 As 
Tambo made clear, the Western powers had clear interests in bolstering the apartheid 
regime because the white minority government could secure their interests in South 
Africa, including the exploitation of South Africa’s uranium mines. But even worse, 
with the support for South Africa’s nuclear programme, a new level of security risks 
for the black majority in South Africa was reached: ‘these countries [The Western 
Powers] have in fact been working to make the racists self-sufficient in military 
hardware.’151 According to Tambo, the apartheid regime would never come to an end 
as a result of these new developments, since it would become too powerful and was 
supported by various world powers.152 
 An important aspect of the diplomatic efforts was to draw attention to the 
problems of the black South Africans in the international community. Since the South 
African nuclear program was developed in cooperation with first the United States 
and later France and Germany, it was of great importance for the black protest 
movements to show the outside world what the implications would be when the white 
minority government would be able to build nuclear weaponry. A clear example of 
this policy can be found in the efforts of the ANC. At congresses and international 
political meetings, the ANC officials held numerous speeches on the impact of 
foreign support of the white minority government. As Oliver Tambo stated at the 
International Conference on the EEC and South Africa that the EEC played an 
important role in the ‘struggle for national and social emancipation of the oppressed 	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black majority in South Africa, and indeed southern Africa as a whole.’153 Going even 
further, Tambo clarified that the collaboration with the EEC countries caused a ‘rapid 
nuclearisation of South Africa’ and should thus be held accountable for maintaining 
the apartheid policy.154 
 A similar approach was issued by the World Campaign against Military and 
Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa that was launched by one of the founders of 
the Anti Apartheid Movement, Abdul Minty. According to Minty, providing 
information to the outside world was not enough. He encouraged the Western Powers 
to take public action and put pressure on the South African government.155 The 
AACC followed a similar line of diplomatic protest but it combined its efforts to 
mobilize foreign politics against the apartheid regime with the efforts in the 
ecumenical community.  
 The AACC tried to lobby for support at church groups that supported the 
apartheid regime by showing how this regime affected the church in general. Talks 
between the AACC and the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD) for instance show 
that the AACC members pointed out the issue of racist German Lutherans in South 
Africa. According to the AACC, the EKD supported the white minority government 
by paying their white preachers way more than black preachers earned. On top of that 
they refused to invite black preachers in the German churches in South Africa. Both 
the AACC and the EKD agreed that the relationship between the African and the 
German Lutherans had to be improved and should not be in favour of a racist 
policy.156 Since the German government provided the nuclear technology that the 
South African regime used, the relationship with the German churches was of great 
importance. The anti-nuclear protesters tried to encourage the German churches to put 
pressure on their government to make them stop supporting the South African nuclear 
developments. In telegrams between reverend John Gatu and chairman of the Council 
of Bishops Helmut Class this issue was made very clear: ‘We therefore earnestly urge 
that (…) the Evangelical Church in Germany will do everything possible to bring 
pressure upon your government and German industrial firms to desist from enabling 
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the apartheid regime in Pretoria to be in a position to threaten the entire African 
continent and world peace’157  
 Another way for the ANC to bring its message to the public was the illegal 
distribution of flyers under the South African people. Young members of the ANC 
were trained by the movement to be able to produce, duplicate and distribute 
propaganda in favour of the ANC and black majority rule, and against the white 
minority government. The flyers were being spread in a unique way, using ‘leaflet 
bombs’: ‘These were hardly 'bombs' in the real sense of the word but simple timed 
explosive devices for throwing bundles of leaflets high into the air in order to spread 
them over a large area where a target crowd of people were gathered.’158 The leaflets 
bombs, which had a timer attached to them were successful because they could spread 
flyers without anyone being caught. The flyers not only contained anti-government 
messages but also encouraged people to join the ANC.  
 A widely conducted act of civil disobedience by South African protesters was 
the refusal of military service. According to Sjollema, between 1975 and 1978, a lot 
of conscripts had a ‘crisis of conscience’, due to various acts of repression against the 
people of South African countries in which the army had to participate.159 As well, as 
mentioned in a press statement by the ANC in October 1979, ‘an avalanche of 
political crisis’ was increasing the distance between the rulers and the civilians even 
further in South Africa.160 For the ANC members this meant a stronger opposition to 
the white minority regime, manifested in public protests and strikes. The ANC even 
spoke of taking ‘stones and spears to arms’.161 Since the South African army was a 
racist institution as well, military conscripts put down their work. According to the 
ANC the number of army deserters rose quickly and caused worries for the white 
minority regime. Protests started as well after the news became public that BOSS, the 
Bureau of State Security from the white minority government hired more spies to spy 
amongst the black South Africans. The protests were met by the government with an 	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immediate march of army trainees and an unofficial nuclear bomb detonation on the 
South African shore. According to the ANC this was a clear show of force against the 
black protesters and army deserters.162  
 The idea that the nuclear test was a response to the protests by the military 
conscripts should be questioned because the political purpose of such statements by 
the ANC should always be verified. The South African government has not admitted 
such a connection, and even the event of the test in general remains questionable. 
Recent declassified sources from the American National Security Archive however 
confirm that the detected signals of the nuclear test ‘were unique to nuclear shots in a 
maritime environment.’163 For the ANC however, the tests were a clear response to 
their unrest and to them this confirmed the bad intentions that the white minority 
government had against them with their nuclear program.  
 The black anti-nuclear movement in South Africa organised public gatherings 
or marches very often. The years prior to the announcements on South Africa’s 
nuclear developments were characterized by brutal actions against anti-apartheid 
protesters by the South African government. In 1976 for instance, over twelve 
thousand school children boycotted their classes and marched the streets due to a pro-
apartheid language policy in their schools. The government issued the police to fire at 
the schoolchildren, which caused a bloodbath.164 In the months following, many more 
protesters were killed and almost 400 deaths were confirmed. As well, thousands of 
black protesters were detained and many Black Consciousness movements were 
banned.165 Due to all this violence and the banned movements, it was difficult and 
dangerous to stage public protests in South Africa.166  
 This did not mean, though, that there were no public actions being organized. 
Many protests and violent attacks were staged, not only by the ANC or MK, but also 
as local initiatives, to show the dissatisfaction with the policy of the white minority 
government and apartheid in general. Almost none of these, mostly violent, protests 	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had a direct focus on the abolishment of nuclear weaponry. Only one violent attack 
was specifically aimed at the nuclear policy. Under the name Operation Mac, in 1982 
members of the ANC bombed the Koeberg nuclear power plant. As previously 
mentioned, in 1979 the ANC had announced a new and more violent phase in its 
actions against the white minority government. This attack was part of the new 
phase.167 Although the ANC members managed to plant the bombs in the highly 
secured plant, and all four bombs that were planted went off, the action was not 
totally successful. The ANC had managed to damage the plant, but nevertheless it was 
still possible to repair the damage. A few months later, the plant was fully repaired 
already.168 
3.4 Message and Rhetoric 
Just like the American protesters, the South African black anti-nuclear protesters as 
well had a specific message in their protest efforts. But although both the American 
and South African protesters felt they were discriminated against by the nuclear 
developments, both movements had a very different message. As John Gatu stated in 
1977, ‘the Pretoria regime will not hesitate to pull the nuclear trigger when it feels 
that its abominable system of apartheid is being seriously threatened.’169 This quote 
was exemplary for the message that the protesters tried to spread and provided a clear 
motivation for their actions as well: making sure that the rest of the world was aware 
of the nuclear developments in South Africa and show the white minority government 
that they did not agree with this.  
 An often-used symbol for the AACC is a drawing of the African continent, in 
various ways. Since the AACC represented churches not only in South Africa, but in 
the rest of the continent as well, they depicted the continent often with a big cross on 
top of it. This was exemplary for the religious unity that they could bring with their 
actions.170 Another variation on this symbol that was used by the AACC to address 
their cause was a drawing of Africa with two explosions on it, which was made on 
behalf of the AACC. The centre of the explosions depicted the Western powers that, 
according to the AACC, exploited South Africa by helping the white minority regime 
with the development of their nuclear power plants. The red surroundings of the 	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explosions are a metaphor for the actual nuclear explosions in South Africa, which 
could cause ‘bloody and tragic consequences not only on Southern Africa but on all 
of Africa and the entire world.’171  
 As previously mentioned, for the South Africans who did not agree with the 
policies of the white minority government, it was hard to express their protests in 
public. Besides, they would not have any access to the mainstream media. Due to this, 
putting up posters in public places was an important method to communicate 
messages amongst each other.172 The South African government was often depicted in 
a very negative way. On a poster from the ANC that encourages people to end army 
conscription, a white army commander was depicted; looking at a soldier whose head 
was depicted as a hand grenade, ready to explode. This was a message to the people 
that the white government would only use the black conscripts to use for its own 
defence.173 The government was as well being depicted on posters as just a helicopter 
or a military vehicle, often in relation to a helpless black civilian, to show the power 
relations between the two.174 But many of these public messages were not solely 
directed against the nuclear policy of South Africa, but against the repression of the 
black people in South Africa in general. Banners that were held up during protests had 
messages in favour of freedom for the people and were directed against police terror. 
A raised fist was often used to depict the act of standing up to the government and no 
longer accept the oppression.175 As well, chains and bandages were used to address 
the way in which the black South Africans were tied up by the white minority 
government. Broken chains depicted the way in which the protesters would bring an 
end to this tied up life.176 These messages were not directly related to the nuclear 
policy but mostly to the militarisation of the South African government in general, of 
which the nuclear policy was a part of.  
 Just like in the United States, the South African protesters used politicians as 
symbols for peace in their protests. The protesters mentioned men like Nelson 
Mandela and Steve Biko as examples of the terror of the white minority government. 	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Memorial meetings were held to commemorate the death of Steve Biko, who died 
whilst he was in policy custody for protesting against the racist government.177  
 An often-made comparison by the protesters was between the white minority 
government and the German Nazi regime in Europe. As John Gatu stated, there was 
little difference between the nuclear aspirations of South Africa and the six million 
Jews that were killed in Europe. With this, he meant to say that most people did not 
foresee the danger of the Nazi regime until it was too late. By emphasizing the 
dangers of the nuclear developments in South Africa, Gatu clarified that everybody 
should see the danger of the nuclear developments immediately, before it would be 
too late too.178 Pictures of South African streets show graffiti’s of swastikas and after 
fights between government commando’s and ANC members in 1981, helmets with 
drawings of swastikas were found.179 The comparison with the Nazi regime provides 
an insight in the severity of the conflict, and the expected implications of South Africa 
having nuclear weaponry. The protesters were under the assumption that an escalation 
of this situation could end up with the death of millions of peoples too. 
 The fact that the South African protesters were convinced that the conflict was 
very serious and could escalate quickly is also borne out by the way in which they 
drew attention to the dangers of the nuclear developments to the outside world. In 
their communication efforts, the South African protesters often emphasized what the 
implications of the programme could be, not only for South Africa, but also for the 
neighbouring countries, the whole continent, and even the whole world. In a letter by 
the AACC to the United States National Council of Churches, the AACC clearly 
emphasizes the worldwide dangers. According to the AACC, the nuclear 
developments in combination with the ‘racist regime’ would ‘result in a most 
dangerous escalation of the increasingly violent racial confrontation in Southern 
Africa.’180 This could cause a ripple effect that could threaten peace in the rest of 
Africa and as well in the rest of the world. The ANC drew attention to a similar 
danger. According to Oliver Tambo, the nuclear weaponry added to the isolation of 
South Africa from world politics. The isolation of ‘the regimes of terror in southern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1771962-1990 Conflict, The African National Congress (online archive) 
<http://archives.anc.org.za/steve-biko-memorial-meeting/> [14.05.2017]. 
178 The Nuclear Conspiracy, All Africa Conference of Churches, vi. 
179 1962-1990 Conflict, The African National Congress (online archive) 
<http://archives.anc.org.za/increased-aggression-2/> [14.05.2017]. 
180 The Nuclear Conspiracy, All Africa Conference of Churches, 67. 
	   61	  
Africa’ caused growing potential for aggression, which could result in ‘a very real 
threat to world peace’.181 
 The message of the ANC and the MK was more extremist than the message of 
the AACC. The ANC and the MK were in favour of bringing the apartheid regime 
down by using violence. This was also seen in the intensity of the protests and the 
message. The MK aggravated the white minority rule ‘by frequent combat 
confrontations with well-trained, ever victorious ubiquitous units of MK’, who 
literally fought the regime with all weapons at their disposal.182 The AACC on the 
other side was a peaceful organisation, but it too was aware that it might not be 
possible to overthrow the white minority regime without the use of violence 
whatsoever. According to the AACC, it was up to the white minority government 
whether the struggle for freedom would end in a bloody or a peaceful way.183 
3.5 Religious influence 
 Since a great share of the black anti-nuclear protests in South Africa came 
directly from church groups or groups affiliated to the church, the religious influence 
in general is quite clear and already mentioned multiple times in the previous 
chapters. But still it is useful to look into extent into some details of this religious 
aspect, precisely because it is of such importance in the South African anti-nuclear 
movements. Too the black South African anti-nuclear protesters, religious influences 
were very much present. The AACC consisted of different Christian churches. It 
united Catholic churches, Orthodox churches, Missionary churches and many 
independent churches.184 Almost 75% of the South African population in 1981 was 
Christian and of that, 73,8% was protestant.185 But ecclesiastical interference got even 
bigger due to the fact that the AACC felt the duty to be a part of the active protests.  
 As stated in a mutual agreement between the AACC and a German church, the 
EKD, both the AACC and the EKD agreed that being Christian; they would always 
have a common objective and responsibility, ‘to ensure that the created earth 	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continues to be safe for the creatures of God.’186 Also, it was their ‘apostolic calling to 
respond in a prophetic way’ to the political and humanitarian issues that occurred 
because of the policy of the white minority regime.187 Because of this they did not just 
support the protesters, but were very active as well in starting their own protests 
against the South African nuclear developments.  
 For the ANC, religious influences were very important too. The ANC 
considered the most black South African churches as their allies because they also 
opposed the apartheid regime and were considered enemies by the white minority 
government.188 Most members of the ANC were Christians and the ANC was even 
founded with the help of various church groups. Because of this, they were closely 
related to Christian institutions such as the AACC.  
 
3.6 Spatial relations 
The South African black anti-nuclear movement had a broad support from the 
international community. Not only ecclesiastical organisations from different 
countries supported the cause of the protesters, also many political institutions. 
Because the South African regime needed the help of the United States and European 
countries to be able to develop their nuclear power plants, the international allies had 
a main role in the South African anti-nuclear protests. The ANC and the AACC both 
cooperated with international allies, who could possibly pressure the governments that 
supported the South African minority government. The protesters had three main 
allies: the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, United States’ anti-
nuclear protest movements, and German and French ecclesiastical institutions. In the 
following paragraphs, the ties with these four allies will be discussed. 
 The most influential supporter of the South African protesters was the United 
Nations Special Committee against Apartheid. This special commission was an 
important ally because is could function as a bridge between the South African 
protesters and international parties who opposed the white minority government. As a 
part of the UN, this special committee was in a position to address the issues of the 
South African protesters to the rest of the world. In a letter to the AACC, in response 	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to the messages on South Africa’s nuclear developments, the special committee 
pledged its full support to the efforts of the AACC against the white minority 
government.189 The committee was aware of the dangers that the nuclear weaponry 
could bring to the black South Africans and to other countries in the region as well. 
The international community could put pressure upon the South African government, 
with, for instance, diplomatic or economic sanctions. Since the protesters themselves 
were unable to impose sanctions to their government with the same influence, this 
ally was of great importance.  
 The black anti-nuclear protesters in the United States could also be valued as 
international allies of the black South African anti-nuclear protesters. As mentioned in 
chapter two, the South African and United States’ governments needed each other’s 
help and resources to be able to keep their nuclear programme running. The South 
African protesters were not only in touch with the protesters from the United States. 
They also tried to get in touch with the American politicians to pressure the political 
decisions by themselves. By sending letters to them, the South African protesters tried 
to give the American politicians an insight in their terrible living conditions and the 
worsening of these that the South African nuclear programme brought along. 
 By getting in touch with the German and French ecclesiastical institutions, the 
protesters tried to stop the nuclear development at the start. In the correspondence 
with these churches, measurements were discussed to stop the German and French 
help to the South African nuclear programme.190 When the German and French 
churches would be able to put pressure upon their governments, they might be able to 
stop the South African nuclear developments program. This was something that could 
not be done by the South African protesters since they had neither the contacts, nor 
the status to get the ear of these governments. The correspondence between these 
ecclesiastical movements has already been discussed in previous chapters, but 
nonetheless it is important to show that they were real allies in the sense that the 
French and German churches stood behind the South African black anti-nuclear 
protesters and were willing to put effort in helping them by putting pressure on their 
own governments.  
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Conclusions 
 
Although the period between 1970 and 1981 is commonly known as a period of an 
ease of tensions between the nuclear powers, or détente, many anti-nuclear protests 
were conducted in these years. Although there were many talks on nuclear 
proliferation, and many treaties signed, the nuclear stockpile actually increased 
instead of declined. Many governments, like the American and the South African 
government, kept on developing and testing new weaponry, resulting in very high 
spending on the defence policies. These developments created a sense of racial 
discrimination for black peoples in these countries. But to what extent were racism 
and anti-nuclear protests interconnected in the United States and South Africa 
between 1976 and 1981?  
 The comparison between the black anti-nuclear movements in the United 
States and South Africa has provided a framework to answer this question. There was 
a clear connection between the South African and American nuclear weapons 
programme and the sense of discrimination of black South Africans and black 
Americans. Both anti-nuclear movements protested against the nuclear weapons 
policy of their governments because in their opinion this policy strengthened 
discrimination. But, although the black anti-nuclear protesters shared the same sense 
of injustice due to the discrimination by their governments’ nuclear weapons 
programs, they had very different means of showing this dissatisfaction.  
 The results of the comparison between the American and South African 
movements are listed below, per theme.  
 
Context of the protests 
The United States’ government was increasing their nuclear stockpile and was 
developing new weaponry at the same time. In the mid 1970’s white Americans had 
far better living conditions than African Americans. Institutional racism caused 
residential segregation, unemployment rates were very high under the African 
Americans and many African American children were raised in poverty. The Vietnam 
War, which ended in 1975, left many African Americans who had joined the army, 
mainly for economical reasons, in despair. For many African Americans, the 
investments by the American government in more (nuclear) weaponry were 
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unacceptable. According to them, the government could not spend millions of dollars 
in these weapons and at the same time neglect the terrible living standards of its own 
people. With the news on the government’s investments in the development of the 
neutron bomb being made public in 1976, a new wave of anti-nuclear protests started 
which included a great share of African American protesters. 
 In South Africa, the differences between the black and the white populations 
were even bigger. Although being a majority in South Africa, the black population 
was being heavily oppressed by the white minority government. Racist laws ruled the 
country, and black people were forced to live together in Reserves, or Bantu’s, where 
living conditions were very bad. With the news made public in 1976 that the South 
African government was secretly developing nuclear weaponry, human rights, 
political and religious organizations started protesting against the nuclear policy of 
their government. In their opinion, the racist apartheid regime could never be 
abolished once the white minority government was able to use nuclear weaponry, 
even if the weapons would only be used for deterrence.  
 
Institutionalization 
A great difference between the American and South African black anti-nuclear 
movements was present in the way the movements were organized. The movement in 
general was larger in the United States. But more importantly, in South Africa there 
were less small organisations that protested against the nuclear policy. In America, 
the anti-nuclear movements encouraged people extensively to find their own 
movement. By enlarging the amount of protest movements, the already existing 
protest movements had more support for their cause throughout the whole country. In 
South Africa, the protest movements were encouraging people to join the already 
existing groups. This difference can also be accounted to to the political freedom in 
the United States, in opposition to South Africa. Due to the fact that the American 
protesters could freely state their opinion on nuclear policy, many anti-nuclear groups 
were founded throughout the years. The end of the Vietnam War brought many 
pacifist organizations in problems since people unregistered because the organisations 
were no longer necessary. Such pacifist organisations often changed their focus from 
specific anti-war policies to anti-nuclear policies. They did not only do this because 
the nuclear developments were the greatest threat for them, they also tried to make 
sure that the existence of their organizations was guaranteed in the future. Because of 
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this, the movement was not based on the size of the individual organisations, but on 
the amount of organizations. By the amount of movements, the protesters could show 
how widespread the anti-nuclear ideas were.  
 In South Africa it was very hard to find a new movement because this would 
cause conflicts with the white minority regime. Therefore the already existing 
organizations, such as the ANC and the MK, encouraged people to join their 
movement. This benefited their cause since it was hard to run an organization that was 
illegal in South Africa, and having more members would make it possible to put more 
pressure on the white minority government and could show the outside world how 
widespread the support for the anti-nuclear cause was.  
 Besides, the differences in the institutionalization of the American and South 
African black anti-nuclear movement are largely to assign to the fact that their 
country’s law oppressed the black South Africans.  
 Meyer’s theory of Political Opportunity Structures can be applied well to 
various aspects of the research on the black anti-nuclear protesters because it 
structures the analysis of the interconnection between the anti-nuclear protesters and 
the way in which their ideas were echoed in politics. Due to this, the theory provides 
an explanation on why the movements started in the détente period and as well how 
they managed to draw attention to their cause. According to the theory of Political 
Opportunity Structures, successful protest groups in the past managed to become part 
of the political system and step into the political space, instead of just showing their 
dissatisfaction with the government policy. Being well institutionalized in society 
would make it easier to step into the political space that was present in the détente 
period. But for the South African protesters this was much harder than for the 
American protesters since they could only institutionalize themselves in a 
revolutionary organization such as the ANC, or in church organisations such as the 
AACC. By violent and diplomatic means, the ANC could become an important 
institute in politics, but still under oppression.  
 Religious organizations were very important in both the American as the 
South African anti-nuclear protest movements since many of the black protesters were 
religious but more important; the religious institutions had humanitarian goals besides 
their religious work. In South Africa, this was even more important than in the United 
States since the government did not particularly ban religious organizations. Due to 
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this, organizations such as the AACC were able to use diplomacy to make themselves 
valuable in the anti-nuclear efforts.  
 The South African anti-nuclear movement had less support from high 
politicians and church leaders, which did not further their institutionalized position. 
This can also be assigned to the racial laws. In the United States, it was legal for 
politicians and church leaders to openly sympathize with the protesters. But in South 
Africa, this was not possible.  
 
Methods 
Although there were similarities in the methods of the South African and the 
American black anti-nuclear protesters, there were mainly differences in these 
methods. One reason for this is the difference in Political Opportunity Structures in 
the two countries. In the United States, the black anti-nuclear protesters had more 
freedom than in South Africa. Although racism was not absent in the United States, 
there were no racist laws and legislations. The American protesters were able to 
organize themselves against the government policy and demonstrate on the streets. In 
South Africa this was not possible because the black protesters were being oppressed 
by the white minority government. They had to limit themselves on the one hand to 
diplomatic efforts and on the other hand to violent acts of civil disobedience. For 
example, the anti-nuclear marches that were often held by the American anti-nuclear 
protesters were impossible in South Africa. The protesters would be beaten down 
right away and, due to the distance that they had to their government and their 
subordinate position, they would be hardly listened to. The American protesters, 
although they sometimes had to endure police violence from time to time, had 
freedom of speech and were able to express their opinion while protesting on the 
streets, even in their capitol city Washington. 
 The diplomatic efforts in South Africa were the result from the notion that the 
South African nuclear programme heavily depended on news from international 
allies. When these allies would yield under the pressure of the anti-nuclear protesters, 
the South African nuclear programme would have to be abolished immediately. By 
conducting diplomatic efforts, the protesters tried on the one hand to raise awareness 
for the dangers of the South African nuclear weapons development in general and 
their own cause of oppression by the weapons. And on the other hand, they tried to 
get their international allies to take action against their own governments to stop 
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supporting the South African government. The violent actions were the result of the 
distance between the protesters and the South African government. According to 
Meyer, such a situation limits the Political Opportunity Structures, which can cause 
an increase in violent actions because it was the only possible means to fight for their 
cause. From their poor position in society, many of the black protesters had no way of 
reaching their government, unless they used violent attacks.  
 Another factor that explains the differences between the protests in South 
Africa and the United States is the fact that the American black anti-nuclear protesters 
had their ideas represented in the government by people such as Andrew Young. Such 
advocates of nuclear decline in the government brought a close tie to the American 
president, which made it easier for the protesters to have their opinions represented on 
the highest levels of decision-making. To the American black anti-nuclear protesters, 
it was not only important to ask for attention for their cause both inside and outside 
the United States, but they also wanted to show the government officials that the anti-
nuclear thoughts were very broadly supported. They were able to unite many different 
people who were strongly opposed to the nuclear weapons program.  
 
Message and Rhetoric 
Both the American as the South African protesters displayed a similar sense of 
injustice in their message, but the message of the South African protesters was more 
violent than that of the American protesters. This was the result of the distance 
between the protesters and politics in South Africa, as shown accordingly to the 
previously mentioned Political Opportunity Structures. The violent actions of the 
ANC and the MK were accompanied by violent speech, and the protesters did not shy 
away from using violent and revolutionary language. To them, this was the only way 
of being able to draw attention to their message. Although the AACC advocated 
peaceful means of protesting, they were closely tied to the ANC and supported their 
actions. The South African protesters for instance often compared the white minority 
regime with the German Nazi regime during the Second World War. To them, the 
situation was similar because they felt oppressed in a way the Jews were oppressed by 
the Nazi’s.  
 Both the American and the South African protesters used depictions of the 
United States, sometimes mocking, other times real representations of the country. 
The South African protesters however, often used pictures of the whole continent of 
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Africa as well. By doing so, they wanted to depict the unity they were willing to bring 
to the continent, which had many oppressors. For the American protesters it was 
important to show that they were Americans, although being African Americans. 
They had the same values as other Americans and to them; the government policies 
were not in line with these American values. For the South African protesters, the 
whole regime was not in line with the values that were South African. The white 
minority government represented oppression, instead of a political representation of 
their own values. Only by the total abolishment of the regime, a true representation of 
their values could become reality.  
 Both the American and the South African protesters used important fore 
fighters of black human rights as a symbol for their struggles. There were differences 
though, in the kind of fore fighters they used. In the United States, depictions and 
texts of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X were used for instance. These men had 
died for the cause of equal rights for all people and religions, and were used to 
address that racism was still present in the United States. In South Africa, people such 
as Nelson Mandela were used to draw attention to the struggle, but were still part of 
the struggle as well. Mandela was a member of the ANC and was thus used as an 
example for the lack of freedom of speech in the country.  
 
Religion 
Both the American and the South African protesters were largely Christian. They saw 
it as their duty to protest the nuclear policies because it was their calling as Christians 
to make sure that the earth and the people on it would be protected from such evil. For 
the Christian protesters all people should be equal, just as stated in the bible, and thus 
a policy that exacerbated racism and inequality, should be stopped. For the American 
protesters, the religious motivation was even stronger than for the South African 
protesters. Since they often viewed the United States as a divine country that had its 
destiny determined in a covenant with God, they saw their cause as a divine one and 
one that was of immense importance.  
 Due to this large religious influence, in both America and South Africa the 
church was an important factor in the protests and provided an important meeting 
place. More than in the United States, in South Africa the protesters were often 
dependent on such places since their actions could be viewed as illegal. The church 
could be a safe meeting place in such instances. As well, in both the United States and 
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South Africa, church leaders played an important role in the protests. They helped 
with organizing the protests but were mainly active in diplomatic efforts. Because the 
Christian churches often had a worldwide network, they managed to gain support for 
their cause from over their country’s borders. For the South Africans for instance, the 
contacts with the German churches were of great importance. The Political 
Opportunity Structures can explain the importance of these efforts. The churches 
managed to decline the gap between the protesters and politics and thus managed to 
create more opportunities for the protesters. Church leaders often had peaceful 
intentions and were thus good spokesmen for the protesters.  
 
Spatial relations 
Both the American and the South African protesters were aware that the nuclear 
developments in their countries were dependent on foreign allies or enemies and 
although the movements were quite different, both relied heavily on international 
allies. The American nuclear build-up would only stop when the Soviet Union would 
stop with their nuclear developments as well. That is why the Soviet anti-nuclear 
protesters were important allies for them. The South African nuclear programme was 
heavily dependent on technology and knowledge from Germany and France, and thus, 
anti-nuclear efforts from these countries were of great importance for them as well. 
By keeping contact with these international allies, the protesters would be able to put 
pressure on these foreign governments.  
 Closely connected to the anti-nuclear movements in South Africa were the 
anti-apartheid movements. The UN Special Committee against Apartheid for instance, 
was not directly a party dedicated to the anti-nuclear cause. But because the nuclear 
developments could strengthen the apartheid in South Africa, they remained closely 
connected to the AACC.  
 
Transfer of ideas 
Although the movements in the United States and South Africa had largely the same 
feeling of injustice, and the same goals, there was no real transfer of (political) ideas. 
The protesters wanted to raise awareness for their cause on a national and 
international level. There has been contact between American and South African 
organizations in during the second half of the détente period, but there are no clues 
that there was a real transfer of ideas. The differences between the two countries were 
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very large and because of this, it was not possible to take over and implement each 
other’s ideas on their own cause. It seems that the contact between the two countries 
was largely the result of worldwide networks of anti-nuclear and anti-apartheid 
organizations. Instead of providing each other with ideas on how to organize their 
protests, they mainly just pledged support to each other’s cause. 
Recommendation for further research 
Further research on the topic of discrimination due to national nuclear policies will be 
possible. Whereas the comparison in this thesis is between two countries, this 
comparison can also be made with more countries. The United Kingdom, France, 
China, India, Israel and many other states had nuclear weaponry of were conducting 
nuclear tests in 1976 already. By broadening the comparison and compare more 
countries the link between discrimination and nuclear policy can be strengthened. 
There will be a better understanding of the anti-nuclear protesters with a sense of 
discrimination as well. 
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